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1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Five companion cases round out the "Younger sextet": Samu-
els v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216
(1971).
Many commentators have analyzed the Younger doctrine. See Abrahams & Mattis,
The Duty to Decide vs. The Daedalian Doctrine ofAbstention, I U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. I
(1977); Aldisert, On Being Civilto Younger, I I CONN. L. REv. 181 (1979); Bartels,Avoidinga
Comity of Errors 4 Modelfor Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with
State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1976); Carey, Federal Court Intervention in
State Criminal Prosecutions, 56 MAss. L.Q. 11 (1971); Dittfurth, The Younger Abstention
Doctrine- Primary State Jurisdiction over Law Enforcement, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 445 (1979);
Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977); Geltner, Some Thoughts on the Limiting of
Younger v. Harris, 32 OHIo L.J. 744 (171); Goldstein,A- Swann Songfor Remedies: Equitable
Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978); Kennedy & Schoonover,
Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the Burger Court, 26 Sw. L.J. 282 (1972);
Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Needfor Prospective Relief, 1977
Sup. CT. REv. 193; Laycock, Federal Integference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dom-
browskiForgot, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 636 (1979); Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Crimi-
nal Proceedings: Dombrowski Younger, and Beyond, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1324 (1972); Maraist,
Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings." The SignyFcance of Dombrowski,
48 TEX. L. REv. 535 (1970); McMillan, Abstention-The Judiciar/s Self-Inflicted Wound, 56
N.C. L. REv. 527 (1978); Pell, Abstention-4 Primrose Path by Any Other Name, 21 DE
PAUL L. REV. 926 (1972); Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Deference in Search of
a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978); Sedler, Younger and Its Progeny: .4 Variation
on the Theme ofEquity, Comity and Federalism, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 681 (1978); Sedler, Dom-
browski in the Wake of Younger: The Viewfrom Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1;
Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV.
1141 (1977); Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Wechsler); Weinberg, The New Judicial Fed-
eralism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interfer-
ence with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits ofJudicial Discretion,
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most important decisions of the 1970's. In Younger, the Court disap-
proved a federal injunction against a state criminal prosecution that
was alleged to violate first amendment rights. The Court, the lower
courts, and the commentators still are attempting to define Younger's
meaning and its application beyond its obvious boundaries. This un-
certainty and confusion have resulted largely from the Court's unwill-
ingness to place Younger in an historical and policy context. For the
most part, the Court's guidance has been limited to strictures against
federal injunctive intrusion into state court criminal proceedings. This
reluctance to intervene has been explained in vague references to "Our
Federalism," a concern for the independence of the states and their
court systems.
The courts and the commentators have failed to see the Younger
cases as specific applications of broad themes that have continually per-
plexed American courts. These themes are not peculiar to the relations
of federal and state courts in a dual-court system. Nor are these themes
peculiar to the relation of equitable relief and the criminal process. If
the courts would relate applications of Younger to broader themes, the
outcome in a case controlled by Younger would be more predictable
and, after disposition, more convincing.
In any court system, state or federal, courts attempt to avoid dupli-
cative litigation. If a dispute can be resolved with one lawsuit instead
of two or more, a court will desire to resolve the dispute in one lawsuit.
53 N.C. L. REV. 591 (1975); Wilkinson, Anticipatory Vindication of Federal Constitutional
Rights, 41 ALB. L. REV. 459 (1977); Zeigler, An Accomodation of the Younger Doctrine and
the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal
Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266 (1976); Comment, Closing the Courthouse Door. The Ex-
panding Rationale of Younger Abstention, 19 B.C.L. REV. 699 (1978); Comment, Limiting the
Younger Doctrine.4 A Critique and Proposal, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1318 (1979); Comment, Post-
Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: 4 CriticalAnalysis, 1976 DUKE L.J.
523; Comment, Federal Declaratory Relieffrom Unconstitutional State Statutes: The Implica-
tions of Steffel v. Thompson, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 520 (1974); Developments in the Law,
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1274-1330 (1970); Comment, Federal
Injunctive Relief Against State Court Criminal Proceedings: From Young to Younger, 32 LA.
L. REV. 601 (1972); Note, Federal Injunctions and State Criminal Prosecutions: Vestiges of
"Our Federalism," 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (No. 1) 165 (1972); Note, Federal Courts-Younger
Doctrine-State Criminal Defendant Must Exhaust State Appellate Remedies Before Seeking
Federal Relief on Matters Collateral to the Merits of State Prosecution-New Jersey v.
Chesimard, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1212 (1977); Note, Younger Grows Older. Equitable Absten-
tion in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 870 (1975); Note, Federal Relief Against
Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 965 (1973); Note, Younger Abstention: The Path of Federal Non-Interference
in State Court Proceedings-Comity and Federalism, 5 OHIo N. U.L. REV. 658 (1978); see
also Stickgold, Variations on the Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Intervention in
State Criminal Proceedings Affecting First Amendment Rights, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 369.
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The desire to avoid duplicative litigation may compete with another
theme that is not unique to a dual-court system: the desire to avoid
inequity that the litigation process itself may impose upon a party. The
normal course of trial and appeal, intended to protect legal rights, may,
in some rare instances, operate to deprive a person of legal rights. In
these situations, extraordinary relief is necessary and can be granted;
the relief comes, however, at the expense of duplicating and interfering
with another court's efforts.
This tension can exist in a unitary court system. Moreover, the
tension may manifest itself in the context of purely civil litigation. The
courts have struggled with this tension both in the setting of a unitary
court system and in the setting of purely civil litigation. The path of
the decisions has been uneven, but they offer helpful guidance.
Federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings is a more
specific application of these themes. In the past, the Supreme Court's
decisions have drawn on this tradition; even when not explicitly noting
the parallels, the Court's decisions have paralleled the treatment given
to the broader problems.
The Younger line of decisions has been inattentive to the rich body
of law on which it might draw. The general allusions to "Our Federal-
ism" are a poor substitute for a reasoned and explicit consideration of
the tension between the broad themes already noted. The Court's
Younger decisions have sanctioned intervention when, under Younger,
approval of intervention would be unlikely. By contrast, these in-
stances of intervention seem quite sensible if one considers the broader
themes. The Court has also refused to intervene in cases in which, be-
cause of history and policy, it should have intervened.
As the Court has not given a broad consideration to the Younger
problem, it has created uncertainty about Younger's "extension" to
purely civil litigation. The very statement of the problem implies that
the Younger doctrine is a specialized island that has no immediately
discernible bridges to the mainland. Stated in these misleading terms,
the courts have given uncertain, contradictory responses. It is difficult
to build a bridge if one does not know where the mainland is or even
that the mainland exists. Until the federal courts determine how they
regard duplication of the work of the state courts, they will have diffi-
culty deciding whether to "extend" Younger to state civil litigation.
This Article begins with a critical discussion of the broad themes
as they arise in both a unitary and a dual court system and in the
framework of purely civil litigation. It then relates to these themes the
pre-Younger decisions on federal intervention into state criminal pro-
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ceedings. Younger and post-Younger cases are measured against these
earlier decisions. Old law is not better, but provides valuable insights
into the classic, recurring problems of which post-Younger cases have
failed to take advantage. The Article concludes with an examination of
Younger as it relates to state civil litigation.
Duplicative or Overlapping Proceedings
The Supreme Court often has vacillated with respect to the mean-
ing of duplicative litigation in the context of simultaneous litigation in
federal and state court systems, sometimes limiting the category to
cases with strict identity of parties and issues,2 but more frequently in-
cluding cases that present a similarity of core issues.3 The Court disap-
proves of duplicative litigation, however it is defined. Coordination of
duplicative litigation has been developed in many contexts other than
the protection of federal civil rights against state action. In these
broader contexts, problems have arisen ever since the establishment of
concurrent jurisdiction, and the solutions are even now in a state of
flux. The discussion that follows first considers the treatment of dupli-
cative proceedings4 within a single court system, emphasizing duplica-
tive proceedings pending in separate districts within the federal court
system. Duplicative proceedings that are lodged simultaneously in a
state court and in a federal court are then analyzed.
Within a Unitary Court System
Duplicative proceedings within a single court system generally
have been held in disfavor.5 They may harass a party by forcing incon-
venient and expensive participation in more than one lawsuit.6 They
may call for an unnecessary and inefficient use of scarce judicial re-
2. E.g., Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865). For a discussion of Buck, see
text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
3. Eg., Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258 (1910); Riggs v.
Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867). For a discussion of Rickey Land & Cattle
Co., see notes 68-70 & accompanying text infra.
4. The phrase "duplicative proceedings" is ambiguous. It could refer to identical law-
suits and to lawsuits that call for only partial duplication of efforts, because they relate to
common, though not identical, issues. Because the cases have expanded relief to cover both
meanings, the phrase as used in this Article includes both meanings. "Overlapping proceed-
ings" is used also to denote the second meaning of duplicative proceedings.
5. See Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1960); Vestal, Reactive Liti-
gation, 47 IOWA L. REV. 11 (1961).
6. The party filing duplicative lawsuits sometimes has a legitimate reason for doing so
and has no intent to harass, even though this may be the effect. See Vestal, Repetitive Litiga-
tion, 45 IOWA L. REV. 525, 526-28 (1960).
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sources.7 They also may lead to confficting judgments that create con-
fusion for the parties and undermine respect for the courts.
8
Early cases allowed a plea in abatement dismissing a later-fied
duplicative lawsuit.9 The plea in abatement was granted only if the
two lawsuits had identical parties, causes of action, and remedies
sought.' 0 With these stringent requirements, the plea was seldom ap-
propriate. While some courts relaxed or misapplied the strict require-
ments for abatement," others, recognizing that duplication short of
true identity called for relief even though abatement would be im-
proper, developed the use of the stay. Rather than dismiss the later-
filed action, the second court would stay its proceedings to await the
outcome of the first action.
Hurd v. Moiles12 illustrates this development. Mortgagors filed
suit in federal court for an accounting under their mortgage and a can-
cellation of the mortgage and notes. The defendant-mortgagees in that
suit filed a second suit in federal court against the mortgagors, seeking
foreclosure of the mortgage.' 3 Although a judgment for the defendant-
mortgagees in the first suit would not provide them with the relief they
sought in the second suit, it would create an estoppel in their favor.
Thus, although the two lawsuits were not identical, they shared core
issues. The second court acknowledged that it could not properly sus-
7. See P. Beiersdorf& Co. v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y.
1950).
8. Whichever action first comes to final judgment should have a preclusive effect. If
an appeal or appeals are taken, however, both judgments could be outstanding, and neither
would have a preclusive effect. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 41, Com-
ment d; 2 A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 722 (5th ed. 1925).
9. Traditionally, the second suit, not the first, was abated. Kirman v. Borzage, 89 Cal.
App. 2d 898, 202 P.2d 303 (1949); McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co., 236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d
860 (1952). Some courts allowed the plaintiff to avoid abatement by dismissing his or her
first action. Fontaine v. Peddle, 144 Me. 214, 67 A.2d 539 (1949); Stahler v. Sevinor, 324
Mass. 18, 84 N.E.2d 447 (1949). Rut see In re Georgia Power Co., 89 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.
1937) (dismissal would have prejudiced defendant).
10. See The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118 (1894); J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, HAND-
BOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 206, at 420 & n.53 (1969); B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF
COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 225, at 390 & n.19 (3d ed. 1923).
11. In State ex re. Green Mountain Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 145 Wash. 532, 261
P. 97 (1927), a mortgagor filed suit against his mortgagee in one county. The mortgagee
then brought a foreclosure action in another county. The court held that abatement should
have been granted. Under the strict identity test, however, abatement was not proper, al-
though a stay order may have been appropriate. For a discussion of Green Mountain Lum-
ber, see Note, 41 HARv. L. REv. 661 (1928).
12. 28 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mich. 1886).
13. The mortgagees filed their suit in the district where the land was located, probably
believing themselves compelled to bring their "local" action in that district. See Livingston
v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
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tain a plea in abatement because the lawsuits were not identical, but
stayed further action until the first action had concluded. Hurd thus set
forth a preference to allow the lawsuit that was filed first to proceed. 14
If a choice must be made between two suits, either one of which
presents an unacceptable level of duplication, priority in filing may be
the only neutral basis of choice. When the two lawsuits are truly iden-
tical, a "first-filed" rule is defensible. The second lawsuit, when filed
by the same plaintiff, usually suggests harassment. 15 If, on the other
hand, it merely indicates poor planning by the plaintiff, the defendant
may rightfully insist that the plaintiff be held to his or her initial choice,
especially after the defendant has incurred expenses for the first suit.
When the two lawsuits are not identical, a "first-filed" rule is also
justifiable. A filing of a second lawsuit by the defendant in the first
lawsuit, which presents the same issues as the former lawsuit, may rep-
resent an effort to defeat the plaintiffs choice of forum.
When the parties in the two lawsuits are not identical, however,
other problems arise. 16 The Court, in Landis v. North American Co. , 7
expanded the use of stay orders to situations in which the parties are
not identical. In Landis, two utility holding companies, in separate
suits filed a day apart, sought injunctive relief in the District of Colum-
bia against the enforcement of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935.18 On the day before one suit and on the same day as the
other, the government brought suit under the statute against other com-
panies in the Southern District of New York to compel their registra-
tion under the new Act. Numerous suits either challenging the
constitutionality or seeking the application of the Act were commenced
in various districts by other nonregistered holding companies. The gov-
ernment sought a stay of the plaintiffs' suits, representing that it would
diligently prosecute its "test case" in the Southern District of New
York. The government assured the parties that until the Act had been
14. The autorities cited, but not discussed, by the court had also employed a first-filed
rule. 28 F. Supp. at 899. These authorities, however, merely made conclusory statements
that the first court's jurisdiction becomes exclusive upon filing.
15. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. Kilbourne & Clark Mfg. Co., 235 F. Supp.
719 (W.D. Wash. 1916) (plaintiff enjoined from prosecuting patent infringement action
against purchasers of product until determination of suit against manufacturer of product).
16. Compulsory and permissive counterclaim devices, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13, have
largely eliminated the occasion for overlapping lawsuits when the parties are identical, but
overlapping proceedings continue to create problems when the parties are not identical. In
these cases, the first-filed rule has received limited, but significant, support. See text accom-
panying notes 17-31 infra.
17. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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upheld by the Supreme Court in the test case, it would neither initiate
enforcement suits nor seek penalties for infractions of the statute com-
mitted while the test case was being litigated. The government argued
that independent consideration of all suits would "clog the courts" and
"overtax the facilities of the Government."' 9 The District of Columbia
court granted a stay until the New York test case was decided by the
Supreme Court, even though neither the issues nor the parties were
identical.
On review, the Court tacitly approved issuance of a stay of limited
duration. The power to stay proceedings, Justice Cardozo wrote for a
unanimous Court, "is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. 20 The government
test case might have been entitled to some preference because it prom-
ised to settle and simplify many legal and factual issues. Nevertheless,
the Court reasoned that, when litigants in separate proceedings are not
identical, the seeker of a stay bears a heavy burden when he or she asks
that a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant
in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.
2'
The Court determined that a stay until all appeals in a test case had
been exhausted would improperly exceed "the limits of a fair discre-
tion."22 The Court indicated that, at most, a stay might have been
proper if limited in duration only until the proceedings in the Southern
District of New York had concluded; but because the proceedings in
New York were almost concluded, the court declined to pronounce
upon the fairness of even such a limited stay order.
In Landis, because the parties were not identical, the Court al-
lowed only a limited stay and attached no significance to the order of
filing. In Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equioment Co. ,23
the Court suggested that the order of filing might be significant when
the parties, although not identical, have a close relationship that con-
sists of more than a common enemy or common goals. Moreover, this
close relationship might sometimes justify a stay of indefinite duration
19. 299 U.S. at 251.
20. Id at 254. Justice Cardozo added, "fo]ccasions may arise when it would be a 'scan-
dal to the administration of justice'. . . if power to coordinate the business of the court
efficiently and sensibly were lacking altogether." Id" at 255 (quoting Amos v. Chadwick,
L.R., 9 Ch. Div. 459, 462 (1878)).
21. 299 U.S. at 255.
22. Id at 256.
23. 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
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that can result in an estoppel in the stayed proceedings.
24
In Kerotest, C-O-Two, an owner of patents brought suit in the
Northern District of Illinois, charging Acme, a competitor's customer,
with patent infringement. Kerotest, Acme's supplier of the goods that
allegedly infringed the C-O-Two patent, then filed suit against C-O-
Two in the District of Delaware for a declaration of invalidity. Faced
with this development, C-O-Two added Kerotest as a defendant in the
Northern District of Illinois. The district court in Delaware enjoined
Kerotest's prosecution of the Illinois action, believing itself bound by
circuit rulings that a prior-filed declaratory judgment action must take
precedence over a later-filed action for infringement.2 5 The court of
appeals reversed because of the expectation that the infringement ac-
tion in Chicago would proceed with dispatch.
2 6
The Supreme Court approved the ruling of the court of appeals
that the declaratory action in Delaware should be stayed. 27 The Court
found no abuse of discretion by the Third Circuit, agreeing with the
rationale that the first suit promised the most complete relief in the
dispute. It refused to approve a "rigid rule" that would rest on priority
of filing;28 this refusal is understandable because each case had a strong
claim to being "first." The patentee's suit was the first to place the
patent in issue. The competitor's suit in Delaware was the first in
which patentee and competitor formally assumed adversary positions.
Thus, even though Kerotest in fact upheld the first plaintiff's choice of
forum, the Court did not prefer the first-filed suit, whichever that might
be, but preferred the suit offering the prospect of the most complete
relief, thereby departing from the first-filed approach of Hurd.
The Court stated in dictum that had the competitor, Kerotest, filed
its declaratory suit prior to the infringement action against Kerotest's
customer, the Delaware court properly could have enjoined a later suit
filed by the patentee.29 The Court implicitly endorsed a first-filed rule
in this instance, even though an infringement action would grant more
complete relief than would a declaratory action. 30 Thus, when a party
24. Id at 185-186.
25. In Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 813 (1942), the Third Circuit had ruled that the first suit to raise the issue of patent
validity between patentee and supplier must take precedence. Under such a rule, the court
of first filing should enjoin the second court.
26. 189 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1951).
27. 342 U.S. at 183.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 185-86.
30. A declaratory judgment in favor of the patentee would not provide complete relief,
especially as to the adversary's customers. On the other hand, were the Court to grant pref-
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initiates the consideration of core issues, his or her diligence secures a
preference against a more comprehensive, although essentially reactive,
lawsuit.
3 '
For convenience and efficiency, coordinate courts in a unitary sys-
tem generally approve the use of the stay, even when parties and issues
are not identical. In cases that are not identical, the courts have placed
less emphasis on priority of filing. On the other hand, when a more
comprehensive action is subsequently brought, which raises substan-
tially the same issues, preference for the first-fied action is likely to
continue. Although a "race to the courthouse" may have a negative
connotation,32 preference on any other basis is difficult to justify. If the
first to file has chosen an inconvenient forum, a change of venue and
consolidation are the appropriate procedural remedies.33
Between a State Court System and the Federal Court System
Duplicative litigation between a state court system and the federal
court system potentially allows harassment, waste of resources, and
conflicting judgments. Conflicting judgments pose greater difficulties
in a dual-court system than in a single-court system, because the two
erence to a later infringement action, the patentee could always deprive the original declara-
tory plaintiff of its choice of forum and remedy. These considerations must have been
powerful, because the Court approved not merely voluntary action by the second court, but
injunctive process issued by the first court. Thus, the Court's dictum preferred some first-
filed actions, in line with the approach found in Hurd v. Moiles.
31. "The bulk of authority supports the position that when a case is brought in one
federal district court, and the case so brought embraces essentially the same transactions as
those in a case pending in another federal district court, the latter court may enjoin the suitor
in the more recently commenced case from taking any further action in the prosecution of
that case. This necessarily follows from the basic proposition that the first court to obtain
jurisdiction of the parties and of the issues should have priority over a second court to do
so." National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1961); 2 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.0612], at 3-40 to 3-45 (2d ed. 1980).
32. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.12 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). In Pro 4rts, the court
gave preference to a later-fied action, deprecating the prior declaratory action as a "race to
the courthouse." Id at 219. The preference for the later-fied action, however, was justified
principally on the grounds that the plaintiff in the later action had filed earlier lawsuits
against different parties involving the same rights. The court's disposition promised consis-
tent dispositions of related lawsuits. But see Kerotest's tolerant reference to the race. 342
U.S. at 185.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976); see also International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d
693 (3d Cir. 1979), both applying 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976), which codifies a first-filed rule,
but also seems to allow a change of venue on a more generous basis than that found in 28
U.S.C. § 1404 (1976). For a general discussion, see Hawarth, Modest Proposals to Smooth
the Trackfor the Race to the Court House, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 211 (1980).
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court systems often exercise concurrent, independent jurisdiction, 34 and
because review by the Supreme Court may not be available to coordi-
nate duplicative efforts leading to conflicting judgments.
35
In early decisions, the Court showed great concern that duplicative
suits not proceed simultaneously to judgment. 36 This concern rested on
fundamental principles of federalism and was not limited to cases in-
volving the custody of specific property.37 The Court vacillated with
respect to its conception of duplicative proceedings; 38 once it found du-
plication, however, it favored the first-filed action, to which later ac-
tions were obliged to defer.39 Thus, state courts received deference not
because they were superior or better suited to the disposition of certain
issues, but only when they began their task before the filing of a federal
suit. Between courts of equal stature, only a neutral factor could re-
solve a conflict. The Court constantly stressed that the equality of the
two court systems demanded that precedence must rest on priority of
filing.40 This equality of court systems was especially appropriate be-
cause both court systems decided mainly common-law issues for the
first hundred years of the Republic. Federal courts, exercising mainly
diversity jurisdiction, decided the same sorts of cases decided by state
courts.
4 1
34. "The rule is well recognized that the pendency of an action in state court is no bar
to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction, for both
the state and Federal courts have certain concurrent jurisdiction over such controversies,
and when they arise between citizens of different States and the Federal jurisdiction may be
invoked, and the cause carried to judgment, notwithstanding a state court may also have
taken jurisdiction on the same case." McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910). For a
discussion of McClellan, see note 72 & accompanying text infra.
35. See note 8 supra.
36. Smith v. M'lver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532 (1824); M'Kim v. Voorhies, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch.) 279 (1812); Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 179 (1807).
37. Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867). "State courts are exempt
from all interference by the Federal tribunals, but they are destitute of all power to restrain
either the process or proceedings in the national courts. Circuit courts and State courts act
separably and independently of each other, and in their respective spheres of action the
process issued by the one is as far beyond the reach of the other, as if the line of division
between them 'was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye.' Appellate rela-
tions exist in a class of cases, between the State courts and this court, but there are no such
relations between the State courts and the Circuit courts." Id. at 195-96.
38. Compare Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867) (similarity of core
issues) with Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865) (strict identity of parties and
issues).
39. E.g., Wallace v. M'Connell, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 136 (1839). For a discussion of Wal-
lace, see text accompanying notes 52-53 infra.
40. See, e.g., text accompanying note 55 infra.
41. General federal question jurisdiction, now embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, was con-
ferred in 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Before that date, the general grants of
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Although all may agree that duplication should be avoided, con-
trol of duplication raises special problems in a dual-court system. As
federal and state court systems are equals, neither should attempt to
impose on the other. One might surmise, therefore, that abatement and
the stay order were the preferred methods of controlling duplication
and that the injunction was disfavored. Moreover, a federal statute
commonly known as the Anti-Injunction Act would seem to bar in-
junction of state court proceedings.
42
The courts made use of abatement and the stay order.43 They also
refused to recognize the judgments of courts that had proceeded im-
properly with duplicative litigation.44 Injunctions, however, were ulti-
mately pressed into service by both state and federal courts to control
duplicative litigation in the other court system.4 5 The significant quali-
fication to the use of the injunction was that it could issue only from the
court of first filing. Thus, the Anti-Injunction Act was not a broad pro-
hibition on the use of the injunction, but a reservation of that power to
the court attempting to control reactive litigation.
Early Supreme Court decisions established that coordinate courts
generally should not enjoin one another.4 6 A New York decision later
jurisdiction were over diversity and admiralty claims. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
73.
42. 1 Stat. 335 (1793) (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)). The origi-
nal Act provided in material part: "[Nior shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay pro-
ceedings in any court of a state .... " Section 2283 now reads: "A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments."
The Anti-Injunction statute has inspired much commentary, most of which laments the
statute's obscure origins and the debatable interpretation of the statute by the Court. See
Dumbauld, Judicial Interference with Litigation in Other Courts, 74 DICK. L. REV. 369
(1970); Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life
History of a Statute, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the
Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 330 (1978); Reaves & Golden, The FederalAnti-
Injunction Statute in the Aftermath 0/Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 5 GA. L. REV. 294 (1971);
Redish, he Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (1977); Taylor &
Willis, The Power ofFederal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169
(1933); Warren, Federal and State Court Inteerence, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1930); Com-
ment, Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: .4 Reexamination of Original Congres-
sional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1979); Comment, FederalPower to Enjoin State Court
Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. REV. 726 (1961); Comment, The Anti-Injunction Statute: 4
Damoclean Sword Blunted, Sharpened, Broken, and .. ./, 22 J. PuB. L. 407 (1973).
43. See notes 9-33 & accompanying text supra.
44. See notes 52-55 & accompanying text infra.
45. See notes 62-65 & accompanying text infra.
46. M'Kim v. Voorhies, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 279 (1812); Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807).
In Diggs & Keith, the plaintiffs had sued on two promissory notes in state court. The
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agreed, principally because an injunction may lead to a counter-injunc-
tion, which would paralyze the courts from rendering any decision in
the dispute.
47
In Renner & Bussard v. Marshall,48 an 1816 case, plaintiff Marshall
sued in federal court on a bill of exchange. He then brought a second
action in state court on the same bill against the same defendant and
joined additional defendants. The common defendant moved for
abatement of the earlier-filed federal court action, which would have
allowed the second case to continue. The second case, in which all the
parties were brought together, offered the prospect of more complete
relief. The federal court refused to abate. Upholding this refusal, the
Supreme Court stated that while the state court action might have been
abated, it would have been improper to abate the federal action.
49
The Court's suggestion that the state court should abate is dictum.
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the two suits were
not identical because additional parties were present in the state court
action.5 0 Second, there was some authority, even in 1816, for the prop-
osition that a prior foreign action might not abate a second action.
5'
Arguably, the federal court was "foreign" because it was not part of a
state court system. Renner & Bussard, then, tacitly approved priority
for an in personam action that is not identical to a later-filed action.
In Wallace v. McConnell,5 2 the Court expanded Renner & Bussard
by denying effect to state court proceedings governing property in the
control of the state court. The plaintiff sued on a note in federal court.
defendant, Wolcott, then became a plaintiff and prayed for equitable relief in the state's
separate chancery court. Diggs & Keith removed the equitable action to federal court,
which proceeded to grant the equitable relief sought by Wolcott. On review, the Supreme
Court simply stated that "a circuit court of the United States had not jurisdiction to enjoin
proceedings in a state court" and reversed. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179.
Equally uninformative is the M'Kim case. M'Kim obtained a federal writ of ejectment
against Voorhies. Voorhies, asserting an equitable lien on the property in question, then
obtained a state injunction against enforcement of the federal judgment. When the federal
court refused to issue a writ of enforcement in the face of the state injunction, M'Kim ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, which ordered the lower court to issue the writ, stating simply
that "the state court had no jurisdiction to enjoin a judgment of the circuit court of the
United States." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 280.
47. Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige Ch. 402 (N.Y. Ch. 1831).
48. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 215 (1816).
49. Justice Story, the author of the opinion, stated in a later case that the parties must
be identical in order to grant abatement. In addition, no abatement is possible when the
other suit is pending in state court. Wadleigh v. Veazie, 28 F. Cas. 1319 (C.C.D. Me. 1838)
(No. 17,031).
50. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
51. See Maule v. Murray, 7 Term R. 470, 101 Eng. Rep. 1081 (1798).
52. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 135 (1839).
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Third parties, claiming as creditors of the federal plaintiff and giving
him notice, then proceeded in state court to attach the debt owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff. The federal defendant admitted his debt on
the note, paid the attaching creditors, and sought credit against any
judgment to be rendered in the federal court. Although the federal trial
court merely had "possession" of a lawsuit, and not of specific prop-
erty, it denied credit for the payment to the third parties. The Supreme
Court approved this disposition, stating:
The plea shows, that the proceedings on the attachment were insti-
tuted after the commencement of this suit. The jurisdiction of the
district court of the United States, and the right of the plaintiff to
prosecute his suit in that court, having attached, that right could not
be arrested or taken away by any proceedings in another court. This
would produce a collision in the jurisdiction of courts, that would
extremely embarrass the administration of justice. . . . [W]here the
suit in one court is commenced prior to the institution of proceedings
under attachment in another court, such proceedings cannot arrest
the suit; and the maxim qui prior est tempore, porior estjure, must
govern the case.
53
The Court was protecting jurisdiction of a prior-filed lawsuit, not spe-
cific property in its control, for the state court had first assumed control
of the "property." Rather than resort to an injunction, the Court
merely denied effect to the state court proceedings, implying that the
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to
the note. Wallace thus enforced the deference to prior federal proceed-
ings suggested in Renner & Bussard.
In Peck v. Jenness,54 decided in 1849, the Court again refused to
recognize the effect of a judgment in a later-filed action, theorizing that
the first court obtained exclusive jurisdiction upon filing. The Court
decided that a discharge in bankruptcy did not avoid a lien created by a
prejudgment attachment that was filed before the federal bankruptcy
proceedings began. In affirming the state supreme court, the Court ex-
plained the paramount status of the earlier state proceedings:
[The state court] was an independent tribunal, not deriving its au-
thority from the same sovereign, and, as regards the District Court, a
foreign forum, in every way its equal. The District Court had no
supervisory authority over it ...
It is a doctrine of law too long established to require a citation of
authorities, that, where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to de-
cide every question which occurs in the cause, and. . its judgment,
till reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court; and that,
where the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a plaintiff to prose-
53. Id at 150.
54. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 611 (1849).
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cute his suit in it, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or
taken away by proceedings in another court. These rules have their
foundation, not merely in comity, but on necessity. For if one may
enjoin, the other may retort by injunction, and thus the parties be
without remedy; being liable to a process for contempt in one, if they
dare to proceed in the other.
55
The Court did not negate all use of the injunction, but suggested that
the court whose process is later involved may not proceed by injunction
or otherwise. Recognizing jurisdiction in both courts could lead to con-
flicting judgments, including injunctions.
56
In succeeding cases, the court continued to assert priority for the
first-filed action, but erratically required strict identity of parties and
cause of action. Thus, in 1865, in Buck v. Colbath,57 goods of an al-
leged debtor were attached by a federal marshal in a prejudgment
seizure. The debtor brought suit against the marshal in state court for
trespass. On review of a state judgment in favor of the debtor, the
Court denied the appropriateness of abating the state action. The
debtor had not sought replevin of the goods. 58 Although the federal
court must retain undisturbed custody, the debtor could seek an alter-
native remedy in state court.
[I]t is not true that a court, having obtained jurisdiction of a
subject matter of a suit, and of parties before it, thereby excludes all
other courts from the right to adjudicate upon other matters having a
very close connection with those before the first court, and, in some
instances, requiring the decision of the same questions exactly.
59
The Court did not discuss or distinguish earlier cases that required less
than strict identity.60 Buck signified no abrupt switch to a strict-iden-
tity test, for shortly afterwards the Court continued to find duplication
55. Id. at 624-25; accord, Chittenden v. Brewster, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 191 (1864); Hagan
v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836). Congress subsequently amended the Anti-Injunction
Act to permit injunctions by the federal bankruptcy court. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 21,
14 Stat. (currently incorporated in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)).
56. An injunction from a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction would not bind the
parties. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The parties might have difficulty, none-
theless, if they could not be sure which court had or lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
57. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865). Accord, Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679
(1871).
58. Replevin would clearly fail under the doctrine of Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 450 (1860).
59. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 345.
60. E.g., Renner & Bussard v. Marshall, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 215 (1816). For a discus-
sion of Renner & Bussard, see text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
The Court gave as an example the treatment of litigation arising out of default on a
note secured by a mortgage on real property. Suits for foreclosure of the mortgage, payment
of the note, and ejectment from the property might each proceed in different courts because
they raise separate causes of action. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 345-46.
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unacceptable in cases that shared core issues.61
By the 1870's, the Court not only disfavored duplication, but also
added the injunction to its range of remedies. Contemporary cases en-
joining state court suits after removal to federal court introduced the
use of the injunction. In French v. Hay,6 2 French obtained a judgment
in a Virginia state court, and Hay removed the proceedings to federal
court to attempt to set aside the judgment. French sued on the judg-
ment in a Pennsylvania state court, and Hay obtained a federal injunc-
tion against the proceedings to enforce the judgment. The Supreme
Court upheld the injunction and rejected the argument that the Anti-
Injunction Act63 forbade relief. Federal jurisdiction embraced every
question in the case; while it lasted, it was exclusive. As federal juris-
diction was exclusive, the Anti-Injunction Act had no application.
These principles applied even in an inpersonam lawsuit. Moreover, the
French Court did not treat the injunction as a special remedy for re-
moved cases. Rather, removed cases merely illustrated the general rule
that prior jurisdiction embraced "everything in the case . ..until it
reached its termination and the jurisdiction was exhausted."64 Prior
jurisdiction amounted to exclusive jurisdiction, which could be pro-
tected by an injunction.65
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, federal courts em-
ployed the injunction to prevent state court litigation that would reliti-
61. See Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867).
62. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874); accord, Dietzsch v. Huide-Koper, 103 U.S. 494
(1880).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). See note 42 supra.
64. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 253.
65. Accord, Reagan v. Dick, 76 Colo. 544, 233 P. 159 (1925); Shaw v. Frey, 69 N.J. Eq.
321,59 A. 811 (V.C. 1905); Lyons v. Importers & Traders' Nat'l Bank, 214 Pa. 428,63 A. 827
(1906); Akerly v. Vilas, 15 Wis. 440 (1862). See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44,
56 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It later became established, however, that a state
court may never enjoin federal proceedings. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408
(1964). Even when the federal proceeding is brought in bad faith, a state court may not
enjoin it. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977). Pre-Donovan cases are ex-
amined in Arnold, State Power to Enjoin Federal Court Proceedings, 51 VA. L. Rav. 59
(1965); Note, State Injunctions Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. Rv.
714 (1942).
The Court's citation of authorities indicates that the removed nature of the proceedings
did not affect its disposition. The modem Court has continued to approve federal injunc-
tions when a state court proposes to act in a removed case. See, e.g., Vendo Co. v. Lektro-
Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 640 (1977). The removal statute does not explicitly authorize a
federal injunction. Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1976) directs that state proceedings be
stayed, a command that can be enforced by denying effect to the state court's judgment.
Although Justice Frankfurter attempted to deny the removal injunction's history in Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 133 (1941), the removal injunction is a vestige of
the courts' general injunctive power to protect earlier acquired jurisdiction.
September 1981]
gate issues decided in federal court.66 A state court suit that would
relitigate an in personam action was enjoinable by a federal court,
which could issue an injunction even if the later state suit alleged a
different cause of action, as long as the federal judgment would pre-
clude a judgment for the state plaintiff.
67
Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux 68 illustrates a broad use
of injunctive power to control duplicative litigation. Miller & Lux,
owner of land in Nevada, brought suit in the Nevada federal court to
assert various water rights in conflict with claimed rights of Rickey, an
owner of land in California. Rickey then brought suit in a California
state court against Miller & Lux as well as against additional parties. 69
In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court approved an in-
junction aganst the later-fled action, although the lawsuits were not
identical. While neither suit involved custody of a res, the nature of the
suits could have produced conflicting judgments.
70
Thus, there has been a strong tradition against duplicative litiga-
tion, although the meaning of "duplicative" was not consistently re-
solved. Contrary to the suggestions in later cases, this disfavor was not
confined to lawsuits involving in rem rights.71 Indeed, duplication was
freely permitted only in the special context of probate proceedings.
72
66. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 137-39 (1941), and the dissent
of Justice Reed, id at 141-54.
67. See Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273 (1906) (dictum).
68. 218 U.S. 258 (1910). For a discussion of this case, see the excellent faculty Note by
Professor Schofield, 5 ILL. L. REV. 508 (1911).
69. The addition of parties was probably made to defeat removal to federal court. The
same strategy was pursued in Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922). See
notes 73-82 & accompanying text infra.
70. Accord, Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R., 247 U.S. 214 (1918). In Looney, railroads
filed federal suit against state-imposed rates. When the state attorney general resorted to
state court to enforce rates, the federal court enjoined prosecution in state court. "The use of
the writ of injunction, by federal courts first acquiring jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject-matter of a suit, for the purpose of protecting and preserving that jurisdiction until
the object of the suit is accomplished and complete justice done between the parties is famil-
iar and long established practice." Id at 221.
71. But see Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977): "We have
never viewed parallel inpersonam actions as interfering with the jurisdiction of either court
72. In probate administration, the Court has tolerated duplicative litigation. In Mc-
Clellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910), the plaintiffs instituted a federal suit to declare their
rights in an estate that was the subject of probate proceedings in a state court. The lower
federal court had stayed its proceedings to allow the state attorney general to file suit for
escheat. In disapproving the stay, the Court declared: "The rule is well recognized that the
pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter
in the Federal court having jurisdiction .... " Id at 282. McClellan did not approve du-
plicative litigation in all contexts. The Court held that federal chancery jurisdiction in di-
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Kline v. Burke Construction Co.
In 1922, however, the Court made a major statement in favor of
duplication in Kline v. Burke Construction Co. 73 In Kline, a construc-
tion company brought an action in federal court against a city for pay-
ment on a paving contract. The city, in turn, fied a suit in state court
against the construction company and its sureties on a performance
bond. After an unsuccessful attempt to remove the city's suit to federal
court, the construction company sought an injunction from the federal
district court against further prosecution of the state action. The dis-
trict court's denial of the injunction was reversed by the Eighth Circuit.
The Supreme Court, in construing the Anti-Injunction Act's prohibi-
tion of a federal court's issuing an injunction to stay state court pro-
ceedings, noted the exception provided by section 262 of the Judicial
Code, which authorized a federal court to issue all writs necessary for
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
74
It is settled that where a federal court has first acquired jurisdiction
of the subject-matter of a cause, it may enjoin the parties from pro-
ceeding in a state court of concurrent jurisdiction where the effect of
the action would be to defeat or impair the jurisdiction of the federal
court. Where the action is in rem the effect is to draw to the federal
court the possession or control, actual or potential, of the res, and the
exercise by the state court of jurisdiction over the same res necessar-
versity cases was not impaired by subsequent state legislation creating probate courts. Id at
281.
As the federal courts have had a long tradition of disclaiming the jurisdiction to probate
wills, see Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946) (dictum), it would seem logical that they
would deny jurisdiction over all suits collateral to probate administration. As property
rights are involved in these cases, avoidance of duplicative proceedings would be an under-
standable goal. Because of the federal disclaimer, however, not even a diligent party could
obtain federal jurisdiction were the Court to enforce a first-filed rule in the context of pro-
bate administration. By 1909, in Waterman v. Canal Louisiana Bank Co., 215 U.S. 33
(1909), the Court had determined that a federal court could entertain a suit for declaration
of property rights, although state probate proceedings had already begun. While the federal
judgment would be personally binding on the estate's representative, the federal court could
not enforce an accounting or directly interfere with the state court's possession of the assets.
That a federal court could render a binding judgment in the face of prior proceedings is
contrary to the Court's statements in Wallace v. McConnell, see text accompanying notes 52-
53 supra, and Peck v. Jenness, see text accompanying notes 54-55 supra. In Wallace and
Peck, however, either party could exercise diligence in seeking the forum of his or her
choice. The exception created in Waterman resulted from the federal courts' inability to
probate wills. Cases prior to Waterman include: Green's Adm'x v. Creighton, 64 U.S. (23
How.) 90 (1859); Union Bank of Tennessee v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503 (1855);
Williams v. Benedict, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 107 (1850); Erwin v. Lowry, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 172
(1849); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67 (1840).
73. 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
74. Id at 229. Section 262 of the Judicial Code is now incorporated in the current anti-
injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). See note 42 supra.
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ily impairs, and may defeat, the jurisdiction of the federal court al-
ready attached.
75
However, apart from the exception governing in rem jurisdiction,7
6
the Court determined that duplicative lawsuits in state and federal
court may proceed without reference to one another. This doctrine as
stated in Kline has been uncritically accepted on many occasions,77 and
courts continue to cite it approvingly.78 Kline, however, misrepresented
prior practice,79 and has been ignored so frequently80 that it retains
little authority. Kline can be interpreted narrowly to forbid the use of
an injunction to control duplicative litigation, but not to forbid the use
of a voluntary stay in the same situation. The continuing importance
of Kline is its rejection of the injunction to control duplicative
litigation.8'
Prior to Kline, a party had no obligation to resort to the state
courts rather than invoke concurrent federal jurisdiction. By entering
federal court, a party foreclosed the possibility of obtaining state court
jurisdiction. The Kline Court's willingness to allow duplicative pro-
ceedings to continue made possible the development of the abstention
doctrine. 82 In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman,83 which laid
the foundation of the abstention doctrine, the Court ordered the parties
to invoke state court jurisdiction for a resolution of state law issues.
The Court desired to avoid a decision based on constitutional issues,
84
75. 260 U.S. at 229.
76. Recognizing that a court might protect its jurisdiction over a res, the Court de-
clared: "But a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy over a mere question of personal
liability does not involve the possession or control of a thing, and an action brought to
enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court in
which a prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free to proceed in its own
way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court.. . . The
rule, therefore, has become generally established that where the action first brought is in
personam and seeks only a personal judgment, another action for the same cause in another
jurisdiction is not precluded." 260 U.S. at 230.
77. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
78. See, e.g., Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) (plurality
opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
79. See text accompanying notes 46-71 infra.
80. See note 93 & acompanying text infra.
81. See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978). But see
Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp., 489 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J.).
82. For a complete discussion of the abstention doctrine, see Field, Abstention in Consti-
tutional Cases.- The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071
(1974).
83. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
84. Id at 498. For a general statement of the Court's reluctance to decide constitu-
tional issues unnecessarily, see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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but preferred not to resolve the state law issues that would have permit-
ted this avoidance. Absent abandonment of its pre-Kline cases, the
Court could not have made such a request of a federal plaintiff, for the
prior jurisdiction of the federal court would have precluded later inter-
ference by a state court.85 Pullman, however, departed from Kline in
one significant aspect. Rather than racing to judgment, which Kline
had urged, the federal court awaited state court resolution, which
would not bind the parties if the plaintiff desired to return to federal
court.
86
Another, more extensive abstention doctrine was created in Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co. ,8 which illustrates the continuing disfavor in which
duplicative proceedings are held. In this variation of Pullman, the fed-
eral plaintiff was required to abandon its federal suit and initiate state
court proceedings that would bind the parties on all issues.
In Burford, Sun Oil filed a federal suit to enjoin an order of the
Texas Railroad Commission that permitted the plaintiffs neighbor,
Burford, to drill oil wells. Sun Oil believed that the neighbor's drilling
would interfere with its own efforts to extract oil. Under state law, re-
view of this type of order was available in a single court that had state-
wide jurisdiction. The Court dismissed and declared inappropriate any
federal review of the merits of the case.
It is unclear why Burford required state court adjudication. Possi-
bly the state court, because it had exclusive jurisdiction over this type
of order, had developed special expertise in deciding a class of cases
that, although capable of being stated in constitutional terms, raised
narrow, technical, factual issues. 88 The Burford Court thus eschewed
the duplication of Pullman and inexplicably awarded priority to a state
action yet to be filed.
The Court also disapproved of duplicative adjudication in Brillhart
v. Excess Insurance Co. 8 9 A garnishment action had been brought in
state court against a liability insurer. The insurer's reinsurer instituted
85. See, e.g., Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867).
86. In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), the
Court, relying on the Congressional grant of concurrent jurisdiction in civil rights cases in 28
U.S.C. § 1983, ruled that state court resolution of federal law issues did not bind the parties
if they chose not to be so bound by specifically reserving the issues, thus preserving their
right to trial court determination of facts relevant to federal law issues.
87. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). For an example of the application of "Buiford abstention,"
see Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern R.R., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
88. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention
Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1156-57 (1974).
89. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
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a federal action for a declaratory judgment that it was not accountable
even if the insurer or the insured should be liable. The judgment-credi-
tor then joined the reinsurer as a defendant in the garnishment action.
The lower court dismissed the declaratory action, and the court of ap-
peals reversed, directing that the trial proceed.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded so that the district
court could determine whether the state garnishment proceedings
would allow the federal plaintiff to assert as defenses the issues raised
in the declaratory action. If so, the district court had rightly dismissed.
Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a fed-
eral court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another
suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not gov-
erned by federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous interfer-
ence with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court
litigation should be avoided.90
Brillhart can be interpreted as a narrow exception to Kline,91 an excep-
tion that rests on the declaratory nature of the federal remedy sought.
The Court's disposition, however, suggests generally that a federal
court should defer to a more comprehensive state action.
92
The courts of appeals have been unwilling to grant Kline a broad
scope and to undertake duplicative litigation. In many cases, they have
stayed in deference to previously-filed state proceedings. 93 The Court
90. Id. at 495.
91. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that the Court may have retreated from the broad language of Brilhart).
92. In this regard, Brillhart previewed Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment
Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952), in which the duplicative proceedings were lodged in two federal
courts. For a discussion of Kerotest, see text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
93. See Ashman, Alfini & Shapiro, FederalAbstention: New Perspective on Its Current
Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629 (1975); Comment, The Viability of Stays of FederalActions Pend-
ing the Outcome of Parallel State Litigation, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 614 (1977); Comment,
Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings. The
Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1977); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings
in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 684 (1960); Note,
Power to Decline the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 37 MINN. L. REV. 46 (1952); Note,
Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59
YALE L.J. 978 (1950).
In P. Beiersdor/& Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951), suit was filed in a Con-
necticut court for a declaration of rights in trademarks. The defendant in the first suit then
instituted a federal action for trademark infringement, seeking an accounting. The Second
Circuit approved a stay of the federal action. Under Kline, this case came to the wrong
result. If Brillhart suggests that the more comprehensive action should continue, the Beiers-
dor/ result is also wrong because the federal suit would be more comprehensive than the
state suit. Deference, however, was given to the first-filed action, which had triggered a
reactive suit whose principal issues were identical. Thus, Beiersdor/ substantially continued
the pre-Kline tradition and parallels Kerotest's prescription for the disposition of duplicative
federal suits. See text accompanying notes 23-31 supra. Other circuits have taken the same
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recently has reemphasized the avoidance of duplicative litigation, thus
suggesting that it has abandoned much of the Kline rule.
94
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,
95
the federal government, asserting water rights in certain rivers, brought
suit against one thousand defendants. The state of Colorado had estab-
lished a system of specialized water rights courts, which sit continu-
ously to establish priorities in water use and to integrate those claims
with rights previously established.96 When one of the defendants in the
federal suit later made the United States a party to the state proceed-
ings, the government was offered a full opportunity to present the same
claims made in the prior federal suit. The lower federal court dis-
missed on abstention grounds; the court of appeals reversed and
remanded.
97
The Supreme Court approved the dismissal on grounds other than
abstention. 98 Noting that "[a]bstention from the exercise of federal ju-
risdiction is the exception, not the rule," 99 the Court categorized its var-
ious abstention doctrines-Pullman,1°° Burford,'0°  and Younger' 02 -
and declared abstention inappropriate on all three bases. 03 The dis-
approach, hesitating to stay only when the case is within exclusive federal jurisdiction. See
Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1975); Lecor, Inc. v. United
States District Court, 502 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1974).
94. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Colorado River Water Con-
servation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
95. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
96. Each river may be considered a res that is administered by one of the water rights
courts. The Court did not, however, base its deference upon a strict rule of prior jurisdiction
over the res. See id at 818-20.
97. 424 U.S. at 806.
98. The Court gave no justification for its approval of a dismissal, when a stay, the
procedural device typically employed, see, e.g., P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1951), discussed in note 93 supra, would have provided more flexibility. If the
state court should unnecessarily delay its decision, a federal court that has stayed may pro-
ceed to judgment, while a court that has dismissed the action may not.
99. 424 U.S. at 813.
100. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (federal constitutional issue
might be mooted by a state court determination of state law).
101. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (exercise of federal review would be
disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern).
102. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal jurisdiction involved for the purpose
of restraining a state criminal proceeding not tainted by bad faith, harrassment, or a patently
invalid state statute). The Court also placed in the Younger category attempts to restrain
state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution that are directed at ob-
taining the closure of places exhibiting obscene films, 424 U.S. at 816 (citing Huffnan v.
Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1972)), and attempts to restrain collection of state taxes, 424 U.S. at
816 (citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffiman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943)).
103. The inappropriateness of Buiford abstention is especially puzzling. See text accom-
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missal was proper because state and federal proceedings were duplica-
tive. Although the federal courts have an "unflagging obligation" to
exercise their jurisdiction, 0 4 even when parallel state proceedings are
pending, "exceptional" circumstances may require deference. 0 5 The
Court considered three factors: (1) the inconvenience of the federal
forum; (2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (3) the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. 10
6
The Court appeared oblivious, however, to the frequent tension be-
tween the second and third factors. A later-filed suit may determine a
variety of related issues more comprehensively and efficiently, but may
also represent the second plaintiff's ingenuity in expanding basic issues
already presented to another court by a more diligent opponent.
The Court approved deference to the Colorado state proceedings
because it discerned a congressional policy against piecemeal adjudica-
tion of water rights in a river system 07 and because, while separate
proceedings might create conflicting or inconsistent dispositions of
property interests, the pending Colorado proceedings supplied an inte-
grated resolution of federal claims with state-created rights. 10 8 Thus,
under this rationale, the Court could justify dismissal of a federal suit
brought by the federal government to adjudicate federal water
rights. 109 When an "exceptional" circumstances test excludes from fed-
eral court a party that has the most extensive potential water rights
claims, the test is suspect.
panying notes 87-88 supra. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
199 (2d ed. 1970). Professor Wright has characterized "Bufford abstention" as a doctrine
that requires a federal court to "refrain from exercising its jurisdiction in order to avoid
needless conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs." Id In light of the
comprehensive system established in Colorado for the determination of appropriate water
rights, described in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
804-05, and the Court's focus on the McCarran Amendment (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666),
which provides that consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit for
the adjudication or administration of water rights when it appears that the United States is a
defendant, the appropriateness of a Burford-type abstention would seem well-established.
104. 424 U.S. at 817.
105. Id at 818. Exceptional circumstances are those that permit "the dismissal of a
federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial
administration." Id The Colorado River Court noted the "res" exception, which for rea-
sons of comity effectively gives exclusive jurisdiction to a court first assuming jurisdiction
over property. Id
106. Id at 819-20.
107. Id at 819.
108. The dissenters persuasively argued that federal adjudication need not be inconsis-
tent with state court adjudication. Federal priorities, based on federal law, could easily be
integrated with existing state-determined rights. Id at 823-25 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. The other factors upon which the Court relied, id at 820, seem insubstantial.
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Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. 110 presented a more common
situation, but did not resolve the tension implicit in Colorado River's
two factors. Suit was commenced in state court for a declaration con-
cerning contractual obligations arising out of a reinsurance agreement.
The defendant in the state court action raised an equitable defense that
the contract violated the federal securities laws, the securities laws of
two states, and common-law fraud doctrines. Relying on these de-
fenses, the defendant requested equitable rescission. It also asserted a
counter claim for damages based on these theories. It did not, however,
rely on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, because federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over claims under the 1934 Act. I'
The defendant simultaneously became a plaintiff in a federal ac-
tion for damages predicated on identical theories of relief. The lower
federal court stayed action on all branches of the federal complaint,
except the Securities Exchange Act claim for damages. The court of
appeals granted mandamus to the federal court plaintiff, relying on the
"exceptional circumstances" language in Colorado River,l l2 and the
Supreme Court reversed. In reviewing the grant of mandamus, the
plurality opinion of four justices emphasized the stringent standard of
review in a mandamus case. The petitioner must demonstrate a "clear
and indisputable" right to mandamus, thus showing that the district
court patently failed in its duty when it stayed in deference to state
court proceedings." 3 Moreover, the plurality stressed that the district
court had stayed, and not dismissed, the action."14
The plurality next noted that a pending state court action does not
110. 437 U.S. 655 (1978), discussed in Note, Abstention and Mandamus After Will Y. Cal-
vert Fire Insurance Co., 64 CORNELL L. R. 566 (1979).
111. 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1976).
112. 560 F.2d 792, 793. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit overruled its previous decision
in Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970). Altheimer had rejected
Kline and had followed P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951). 560
F.2d at 796.
113. 437 U.S. at 662.
114. Id at 665. The plurality acknowledged the possibility that a stay might be inappro-
priate as against the Securities Exchange Act claim, but it did not embrace this proposition,
as had some courts of appeals. The plurality justified upholding the stay on the other causes
of action by stating that it would be pointless to reverse a stay order when the judge could
delay a case without using a stay order and thus escape review by a higher court. On re-
mand, proceedings revealed that the district court had considered the 1934 Act damages
claim to be stayed. It treated the federal action as vexatious because the federal plaintiff
could have invoked federal jurisdiction and avoided duplication if it had removed the origi-
nal action from the state court. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d
1228 (7th Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs concession that it could prove no damages under the
Securities Exchange Act only strengthened the district court's assessment and its resolve on
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bar a federal court action from proceeding. A federal court, on the
other hand, is under no compulsion to decide a parallel action." 1 5 The
decision to stay is left largely to the discretion of the federal district
court. Although it invoked Colorado River, the plurality shifted from
an exceptional circumstances test to an abuse of discretion test."16 Sug-
gesting that the proliferation of litigation has led to more duplicative
litigation than in previous times, the plurality noted that the older view
that litigation may normally proceed simultaneously in two court sys-
tems gives inadequate attention to the burdensome, wasteful results of
duplicative litigation. "17
Thus, although Kline has not been explicitly discarded, its princi-
ple has been repudiated. Colorado River and Will revived the policy
that federal courts should avoid duplicative litigation. In a case like
Will, therefore, a federal court should stay reactive federal litigation.
Similarly, the federal court should proceed when later-filed state suits
are essentially reactive. Although this prescription creates a risk of du-
plication not possible prior to Kline, state courts will probably defer in
these instances without the compulsion of an injunction," 18 as they have
done when overlapping litigation has been filed in other states." 19 In
avoiding duplicative litigation, federal courts should not always prefer
state court resolution of an issue, for this would erode, if not abolish,
congressionally-conferred jurisdiction.
remand not to expend effort on a case whose only purpose was to delay a judgment in the
state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision on remand.
Judicial administration should avoid vexatious litigation. As noted earlier, the courts of
appeals have been reluctant to process reactive litigation when a state suit promised speedy
resolution of the basic dispute between the parties. See Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d
471 (9th Cir. 1979); Genichlor Int'l Inc. v. Multisonics Dev. Corp., 580 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.
1978). See notes 93-94 & accompanying text supra. Will, on remand, fits this pattern.
115. 437 U.S. at 662-63 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)). For a
discussion of Brillhart, see notes 89-91 & accompanying text supra.
116. "Although most of our decisions. . . have concerned conflicts of jurisdiction be-
tween two federal district courts, e.g., Kerotest . . . we have recognized the relevance of
those cases in the analogous circumstances presented here . . . . In both situations, the
decision is largely committed to the carefully considered judgment. . . of the district court."
437 U.S. at 663. This formula was approved in Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip-
ment Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952). For a discussion of Kerotest, see text accompanying notes
23-31 supra. Justice Blackmun, concurring, disapproved of the Kerotest standard and would
have applied the exceptional circumstances test of Colorado River. 437 U.S. at 667-68
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
117. 437 U.S. at 663; see also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d
1332 (5th Cir. 1981).
118. See Tambone v. Simpson, 91 111. App. 3d 865, 414 N.E.2d 533 (1980).
119. See, e.g., Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 119, 214 P.2d 844 (1950);
cases collected in Annot., 19 A.L.R. 2d 301 (1951).
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Inequitable Litigation
The preceding discussion has focussed on the disfavor in which
duplicative proceedings are held. Infrequently, a single lawsuit may
threaten to impose inequity in this context.120 In a unitary court sys-
tem, the appellate process corrects error and is thought to protect the
judicial process from abuse. Thus, coordinate courts within the same
system do not intervene to remedy the inequity of a prior pending law-
suit.' 2' Relying on the appellate process and disfavoring interference
by a coordinate court is justifiable because the availability of review by
a coordinate court may allow duplicative litigation, which itself carries
the threat of inequity.
When courts of separate sovereigns are implicated, the power of a
coordinate court to correct perceived abuses has been less restrained. 122
The policy arguments against such interferences are as strong as they
are in a unitary court system. Abandonment of the appellate process
carries with it the risk of duplication and its attendant evils. If one
sovereign grants an injunction against litigation pending in another
sovereign's jurisdiction, the former arrogates a task that the latter is
able to perform through the normal operation of its appellate process.
Notwithstanding the strong theoretical arguments against such inter-
vention, courts traditionally have intervened to correct inequitable liti-
gation in a separate court system.
State Court Injunctions of Proceedings in Other States
Many cases have arisen in the context of a state court enjoining
proceedings in another state court.'23 Courts have been prompted by
three major purposes: (1) to prevent a choice of law deemed improper
by the issuing court; (2) to nullify fraudulently obtained judgments;
and (3) to control choices of an inconvenient forum.124
120. See Bomeisler v. Forster, 154 N.Y. 229, 48 N.E. 534 (1897), in which the court
restrained a woman from suing to establish rights based upon a man's alleged promise to
marry her and upon his alleged paternity of her children. Because the man had made a
prior settlement wih her in return for a complete release, the court reasoned that a full trial
on the underlying allegations would deprive him of the benefit of the settlement even if he
prevailed on those issues.
121. See Smith v. M'Iver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532 (1824). But see Bomeisler v. Forster,
154 N.Y. 229, 48 N.E. 534 (1897) discussed in note 120 supra.
122. See Sandage v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41 N.E. 380 (1885); New
Orleans & Northeastern R.R. v. Bernich, 178 La. 153, 150 So. 860 (1933); Sharp v. Learned,
185 Miss. 872, 188 So. 302 (1939); Lord Portarlington v. Soulby, 40 Eng. Rep. 40 (1834).
123. See Note, When Courts of Equiy will Enjoin Foreign Suits, 27 IowA L. Rav. 76
(1941).
124. See Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N.J. Eq. 94, 43 A. 97 (1899).
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In the first group of cases, courts have enjoined pending litigation
when it was obvious that a party has filed its suit in another forum to
obtain a choice of law more favorable to its interest. 25 The enjoining
court forbids a choice of law that is seemingly neither unconstitutional
nor contrary to generally shared standards of choice of law. The only
significant limitation on this doctrine is the requirement that an "incor-
rect" choice of law be reasonably certain to occur absent coercive
relief. 126
In Cole v. Cunningham,1 27 the Supreme Court reviewed a judg-
ment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. A Massachusetts
creditor, upon learning that his Massachusetts debtor might seek relief
under the state insolvency laws, assigned his debt to a New York resi-
dent without consideration. The assignee immediately garnished a
New York debt owed to the Massachusetts debtor. Under New York
law, the attachment would have priority over any claims of a Massa-
chusetts assignee in insolvency, the common representative of all the
creditors in a Massachusetts insolvency proceeding. After institution of
the New York garnishment proceeding, the Massachusetts debtor initi-
ated Massachusetts insolvency proceedings. The other Massachusetts
creditors, concerned that the New York assignee would obtain a prior-
ity unavailable to his Massachusetts assignor under Massachusetts law,
obtained an injunction from the Massachusetts state court forbidding
assignor and assignee from continuing the New York proceedings.
The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of an injunction, stating
that the injunction affected the parties, not the New York court. 128 The
Court's refusal to grant deference to these earlier proceedings is note-
worthy because the New York proceedings were brought under quasi in
rem jurisdiction. 129 Relying on decisions granting relief in similar cir-
cumstances,1 30 the Court characterized the conduct of the Massachu-
setts assignor and the New York assignee as fraudulent and
inequitable. Both the Massachusetts assignor and the New York as-
125. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 71
A. 153, 163-65 (1908) (injunction against proceedings in Massachusetts denied because court
found that the defendant had not purposely attempted to avoid New Jersey law).
126. See Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v. Ashelman, 300 Pa. 291, 150 A. 475 (1930) (injunc-
tion not granted because there was no fundamental difference of policy between the chosen
forum and the jurisdiction in which the action arose). A plaintiff seeking an injunction must
show that the defendant brought suit in a foreign jurisdiction to evade the laws of the logical
forum and that the laws of the foreign jurisdiction are oppressively different. Id at 296-98.
127. 133 U.S. 107 (1890).
128. Id at 121.
129. See, e.g., Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 611 (1849).
130. Eg., Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 545 (1862).
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signee sought positions that Massachusetts law would forbid. New
York law, on the other hand, would clearly permit this advantage.
Moreover, had the New York courts proceeded to judgment without
interference, the Supreme Court would have found no constitutional
defect.131 The "procedural" characterization of the preference derived
from attachment stressed the choice of forum. 32 As the New York
court took jurisdiction first, its proceedings should have received
deference. 133
Cole clearly permits one sovereign to find that another sovereign's
choice of law is incorrect, even when that choice would not be uncon-
stitutional. Cole substitutes collateral review for appellate review and
creates the potential for conflicting injunctions, neither of which may
be entitled to full faith and credit.
34
The second class of injunctions 35 against enforcement of fraudu-
lently-obtained foreign judgments, is less controversial than are injunc-
tions based on a forum's probable choice of law. If a foreign judgment
is procured through fraud, a local court need not enforce it under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.1 36 A local court may
give more complete relief by affirmatively enjoining its enforcement,
131. See Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139 (1868).
132. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 590 (1934).
133. Judicial willingness to prevent an "incorrect" choice of law is also illustrated in
Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 39 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 204 (1884). The equity plaintiff, an express
company, had accepted from the equity defendant two packages for shipment. The contract
may have been made in New York; in any event, delivery was to have been made in Chicago
and in Philadelphia. New York law would uphold a limitation-of-liability clause in the
contract of affreightment. The equity defendant had agreed to such a provision and could
have secured insurance for his parcels at a higher value had he been willing to pay an extra
charge. When a claim for loss arose, the shipper brought suit in the District of Columbia.
The carrier countersued in New York for an injunction against the District of Columbia
suit, arguing that the District of Columbia's probable choice of law made the equity defend-
ant's resort to the original forum unconscionable and fraudulent. The New York Court
granted relief, agreeing that the equity defendant acted fraudulently and unconscionably. In
1879, however, the District of Columbia, relying on an 1873 Supreme Court decision, New
York Cent. R.R. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873), had invalidated limitation-
of-liability clauses as violative of public policy. Gault v. Adams Express Co., 11 D.C.
(MacArth. & M.) 124 (1879). Thus, the equity defendant was charged by the New York
court with fraudulent, unconscionable conduct for trying to avoid a clause that had been
held to violate public policy.
134. The questionable basis of these injunctions is reflected in the frequent refusal of an
enjoined court to recognize an injunction against further proceedings. See James v. Grand
Trunk West R.R., 14111. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958); Union Pac. R.R. v. Rule, 155 Minn.
302, 193 N.W. 161 (1923).
135. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 117-30 (1942).
136. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § I. As such a judgment can be attacked in the state of its
rendition, it can receive no greater respect in another forum. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 93, Comment b (1971).
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thus denying the judgment effect in every jurisdiction, including the
state of its rendition. 37 By this step, however, the enjoining court im-
pinges upon the independence of the rendering court, which has full
authority to reopen the judgment on a suggestion of fraud and to give
relief to the judgment debtor.
In a third class of cases, courts have granted injunctions because
the suit pending elsewhere against the equity plaintiff would cause
great inconvenience. 138 As the allegedly inconvenient forum could
grant a dismissal based on a plea of forum non conveniens, an injunc-
tion preempts consideration by an equal sovereign and clashes with the
spirit of comity. Nonetheless, a number of state courts have granted
injunctions. 39
137. See Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 (1854); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 113 (1971).
138. Eg, Guldman v. Wilder, 45 Colo. 551, 101 P. 759 (1909); Mason v. Harlow, 84
Kan. 277, 114 P. 218 (1911).
139. E.g., Kern v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446 (1933);
Reed's Adm'r'x v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794 (1918).
In Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad, 315 U.S 698 (1942), the Supreme Court reviewed a
Tennessee state injunction against an action pending in a Missouri state court and disap-
proved this practice. The Court seemed to reason that if Congress gave a broad choice of
venue, an injured railway worker could not be faulted for employing it. At the same time,
however, the Court, in dictum, suggested that Missouri might dismiss the case on a plea of
forum non conveniens, unless doing so would discriminate against the out-of-state citizen.
Id at 704. This dictum suggests that a chosen forum may close for inconvenience, but that
an injunction by another court is not the proper remedy.
Miles appears to discountenance the injunction only in FELA cases. Control of forum
selection by injunction continues, especially in divorce actions. In these cases, considera-
tions of interstate comity are discounted. In Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N.J. Eq. 94, 43 A. 97
(1899), a New Jersey husband instituted a divorce proceeding in North Dakota. His wife
sought and received from a New Jersey court an injunction against prosecution of the di-
vorce suit. The enjoining court conceded that the wife might have entered a special appear-
ance in North Dakota to challenge jurisdiction on the ground that the husband was not
domiciled in North Dakota, but this appearance would have been inconvenient for the wife.
Moreover, continued the court, "it is common knowledge that the courts of Dakota assume
jurisdiction. . . based on a residence. . . of the plaintiff [husband] which falls far short of
• . . actual domicile. In fact, they are satisfied with a mere temporary residence adopted for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce . . . the task of satisfying the [Dakota] court that her
husband was not a bona fide domiciled resident of the state would be well-nigh hopeless."
Id at 96, 43 A. at 97-98. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 228 (3d ed. 1977);
Comment, Marriage by Injunction: .4 Study of the Problems Enjoining Divorce, 10 VILL. L.
REV. 108 (1964). As domicile was at that time an unquestioned basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 222-24 (3d ed. 1977), the court's
grant of injunctive relief appears to rest on a suspicion that the other court will not find the
facts correctly or will not correctly apply the legal standard raised by the facts. The injunc-
tion issued because of a suspicion that the judicial process of another state would function
improperly.
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Federal Court Injunction of State Court Proceedings
The theoretical difficulties that arise when a court of one sovereign
attempts to enjoin a court of another sovereign are more acutely posed
when a federal court attempts to enjoin inequitable state court litiga-
tion. When a party seeks a federal injunction against allegedly inequi-
table state court proceedings, he or she faces two obstacles. First, the
Anti-Injunction Act forbids such relief and appears to contain only
narrow exceptions to its prohibition.14 The broad language in the
Court's pre-Kline decisions, moreover, would seem to bar such relief,
even if the Act did not exist. 14' Second, the Supreme Court has statu-
tory authority to review federal law issues decided in state court pro-
ceedings. 142 The lower courts should avoid the exercise of a review
function entrusted to the Supreme Court, or the domains of both the
Court and the states will be invaded. Any intrusion by the lower fed-
eral courts rests on the premise that legal proceedings may work ineq-
uity on a party and the appellate process offers no effective relief.
Recent decisions have refused to enjoin allegedly inequitable state
proceedings. In 1970, inAtlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 43 the railroad had obtained a state court in-
junction of the union's picketing. 44 The union unsuccessfully sought
dissolution of the injunction in state court. The union then obtained
injunctive relief in federal district court against the enforcement of the
state court injunction. The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by
Justice Black. According to the Court, the Anti-Injunction Act prohib-
its relief unless the plaintiff can find a specific exception. This prohibi-
tion merely reinforces the original design of the first Congress that the
Supreme Court, and not the district courts, review the judgments of
state courts. Finding no exception in the Act for this case, the Court
vacated the federal injunction.
14.
Justice Black's analysis may capture the intent of the first Con-
gress, but it gives inadequate attention to modem realities. Even if the
140. See note 42 supra.
141. See notes 46-72 & accompanying text supra.
142. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976) the Court has appellate jurisdiction when the
losing party has challenged a state statute under the supremacy clause.
143. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
144. A subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in a related case, Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969), made it reasonably clear that
the state court had erred in Atlantic Coast in granting the injunction. The unions had a
federally protected right to picket under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1976), and that right could not be interfered with by state court injunctions. 394 U.S. at
386.
145. "Only the Supreme Court was authorized to review on direct appeal the decisions
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Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a case arising in the state
courts, its ability to give meaningful review is greatly reduced by its
staggering docket.1 46 While the state court proceedings may have al-
lowed the appellant to build a good record for Supreme Court review,
that party might justifiably prefer federal district court proceedings for
a more careful disposition of federal issues.147 This preference does not
reflect on the ability or fairness of the state courts, but rather is a state-
ment that the Supreme Court cannot give the same extended considera-
tion to cases that it gave one hundred and fifty years ago.
Enjoining Judgments
Justice Black's opinion also does not adequately reflect the tradi-
tion of equitable intervention into state court proceedings. The federal
courts have most often intruded into state proceedings when the federal
plaintiff has alleged that his or her opponent has obtained an inequita-
ble judgment, which the holder is presumed to intend to enforce. A
state judgment could be inequitable because it has been obtained
through fraud, 48 a well-recognized basis of relief upon which the fed-
eral courts have acted 49 even though the state courts could have
granted the same relief. The federal courts have also found inequity in
judgments that rest upon "incorrect" choices of law,150 the doctrine of
of state courts .... Each system proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review
in this Court of the federal questions raised in either system....
Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by in-
tervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appel-
late courts and ultimately this Court." 398 U.S. at 286-87.
146. See Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the
Law and Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043 (1977).
147. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964)
(recognizing the possible preference for federal trial court determination of facts relevant to
federal law issues).
148. See text accompanying notes 134-37 supra.
149. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 599 (1891).
150. Supervisors v. Durant, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 415 (1869). See notes 125-26 & accompa-
nying text supra. In these cases, the state court was found to have chosen incorrect law
because it did not choose the federal common law that a federal court would have chosen.
See note 154 infra.
In the era of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), a state court was not obliged to
apply federal common law. Thus, in the cases about to be examined, the federal courts not
only fashioned a rule at variance with local law, but also branded as inequitable the state
courts' refusal to accept the federal rule, even though they had no general obligation to do
so. These cases are analogous to Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890), discussed in the
text accompanying notes 127-33 supra. On one level, the complete overhaul of federal com-
mon law makes museum pieces of these cases, but they illustrate a willingness-perhaps
continuing-to enjoin when state courts have rendered an erroneous judgment.
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Cole v. Cunningham.1 51 The federal courts have enjoined enforcement
of state court judgments even though appellate review by the Supeme
Court would be available.
152
This intervention is not the general rule, as suggested in Atlantic
Coast. 53 Moreover, the older cases arose over the application of fed-
eral common law, which is no longer an area of controversy. 54 None-
151. See notes 127-33 & accompanying text supra.
152. See Hillv. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 & n.19 (1935); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,
254 U.S. 175 (1920); Supervisors v. Durant, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 415 (1870).
153. See notes 143-45 & accompanying text supra.
154. Before the Court abandoned general federal common law in, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it permitted federal common law to conflict directly with a
state's common law. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893). Thus, it
was possible for a state to employ a different and "incorrect" common-law rule, even though
the state courts were not obliged to adhere to the federal rule of decision.
In Supervisors v. Durant, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 415 (1869), local citizens had obtained a
state court injunction against taxation to satisfy defaulted municipal bonds. The state suit
had been filed and concluded before the federal plaintiff, a bondholder and one of the de-
fendants in the prior state suit, sought relief. The Supreme Court approved mandamus or-
dering the local officials to levy taxes for payment of the bonds. Although the Court granted
mandamus, not an injunction, the decision is questionable. Because the state proceedings
began first, the Court's earlier decisions-especially Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 166 (1867)-should have led to preeminence for the state judgment.
The Iowa Supreme Court previously had approved the statute under which the bonds
had been issued.. When defaults became imminent, the Iowa court changed its mind about
the statutory authorization for the bonds. See Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I
Wall.) 175, 205 (1863). Both state and federal courts should have followed the Iowa
Supreme Court's construction. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842). The Supreme
Court declared that in federal courts, the earlier state court construction would apply, even
though the state court had abandoned its initial position. Gelpecke v. City of Dubuque, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205 (1863).
This difference of opinion gave rise to a startling result in Durant. The bondholders
could have argued in state court that the proposed injunction would deprive them of consti-
tutional rights. If unsuccessful, they could have sought review by the United States Supreme
Court on the constitutional issue. The Court could not reverse the state court for its refusal
to apply federal common law. The bondholders were allowed to avoid the constitutional
issue, however, and obtain a different result by seeking a collateral remedy in the federal
circuit court. Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the state court's result, federal
courts could provide a remedy to make the earlier judgment meaningless.
This analysis reappeared in 1920, in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor. 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
Taylor worked as a messenger for Wells Fargo and was injured during his employment
while riding on a train operated by a third-party railroad. To secure employment, he had
signed an agreement assuming all risk for injuries, holding Wells Fargo and the carrier
harmless from liability. In tandem with this agreement, Wells Fargo had agreed with the
railroad to hold it harmless from injury to its employees or its property. Taylor sued the
railroad in state court and obtained a favorable judgment because the court refused to en-
force the hold-harmless agreement. 58 So. 485 (Miss. 1912). The employer then obtained a
federal injunction forbidding the execution of this judgment. Invoking diversity jurisdic-
tion, the employer argued that Taylor would be acting inequitably if he were to attempt
enforcement of a judgment procured in violation of his agreement. The Court decided that
the applicable federal statute did not prohibit the agreement and implicitly decided that
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theless, the use of federal injunctions against "incorrect" state
judgments remains vital.' 55 If the court finds inequity, it will grant re-
lief, notwithstanding the theoretical availability and wisdom of normal
appellate review.1
56
Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp. ,-57 a 1977 United States Supreme
Court decision, illustrates the continuing inclination to enjoin an incor-
rect judgment. Stoner sold his vending machine company to Vendo
and entered into a non-competition agreement. When Stoner com-
menced a relationship with a Vendo competitor, Lektro-Vend, Vendo
brought suit in state court for breach of the covenant. Lektro-Vend
and Stoner set up federal antitrust defenses; they also brought a sepa-
rate antitrust action in federal court.' 58 The defendants in state court
withdrew their federal antitrust defenses. 159 When, after many years of
litigation, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a substantial judgment
against Lektro-Vend and Stoner, and the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari,' 60 they reactivated their federal suit and requested an injunction
federal common law would uphold the agreement, thus concluding that to enforce the judg-
ment would be inequitable. 254 U.S. at 189. Wells Fargo thus denied effect to a final state
judgment that the Court considered inequitable merely because it rested on an ostensibly
permissible choice of law with which the Court disagreed. The Court found no obstacle in
the Anti-Injunction Act, which referred to state court "proceedings," because judgment is
outside the scope of "proceedings." Id at 184-86. Thus, Wells Fargo made deference to
state proceedings purely formal, because the effect of recognizing a distinction between pro-
ceedings and a judgment, in determining the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, was
that the holder of a state court judgment could not confidently expect that it would be
respected by federal judges.
155. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), see notes 157-68 &
accompanying text infra.
156. See NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246
(1946); Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924); United States v. Adams, 634
F.2d 1261 (10th Cir. 1980).
Nash-Finch is a telling example. In Amalgated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.,
348 U.S. 511 (1955), the Court had previously refused to approve a federal injunction
against a state court order that prohibited union activity. The Richman Court required ex-
haustion of state appellate remedies, even though first amendment rights would be denied in
the interim. In Nash-Finch, however, the Court allowed the NLRB to secure the same type
of relief it had denied the union in Richman. To support this result, the Court found an
"implied" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, a suspect methodology if Alantic Coast is to
be taken seriously. It is understandable that for reasons of policy, the Court would be more
inclined to grant relief at the behest of an administrative agency with specialized experience.
But this type of consideration is not mentioned in Atlantic Coast, which emphasizes state
autonomy and the integrity of the appellate process.
157. 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
158. The federal court suit alleged that Vendo had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976)). 433 U.S. at 627.
159. 433 U.S. at 627.
160. 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 975 (1975).
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against enforcement of the state court judgment based on section 16 of
the Clayton Act,' 6' which authorizes any person to seek injunctive re-
lief against violations of the federal antitrust laws. The injunction was
granted by the lower federal court.
162
The Supreme Court reversed, denying the injunction. A plurality
of three justices, relying on Atlantic Coast,163 declared that the federal
courts may not enjoin state proceedings unless a federal statute ex-
pressly authorizes an injunction. The Clayton Act's general grant of
injunctive relief was not an express grant. The plurality could find no
indication in the legislative history that Congress thought the antitrust
laws could be given their intended scope only by a stay of state court
proceedings. 164 Accordingly, the plurality did not consider whether
Vendo would engage in inequitable conduct by enforcing the judg-
ment. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred in the re-
sult, but disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the Anti-
Injunction Act barred this remedy. Instead, they denied relief because
there was no "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims."'165 In their view, a
single lawsuit should not normally be considered inequitable conduct.
Four dissenters stated that the Anti-Injunction Act was no obsta-
cle' 66 and that even a single lawsuit, as in this case, could constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws and merit injunctive relief.' 67 According
to the dissent, a judgment contrary to federal law is an inequitable
judgment. If the restrictive covenant violated federal antitrust law, a
federal court could enjoin enforcement of the covenant even when it is
embodied in a state court judgment. As the federal courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over claims arising under antitrust law, the state court
defendant is not obliged to raise an antitrust defense, although it may
elect to do so. If the state court defendant chooses not to raise a federal
defense and loses in the state courts, he or she may seek an injunction
and obtain review in the district court. 68
161. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976).
162. The district court held that the injunctive relief provision of the Clayton Act consti-
tutes an express exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the Anti-Injunction Act. 403 F. Supp. at 536.
163. See notes 143-45 & accompanying text supra.
164. 433 U.S. at 631-41.
165. 433 U.S. at 644, (quoting California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 503, 513). The concurring Justices also held open the prospect of relief on "some
equivalent showing of grave abuse." Id at 644 n*.
166. 433 U.S. at 646-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 651-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. [d. at 664-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent followed Wells Fargo but made
an improvement. See note 154 supra. Their proposed choice of law was the objectively
correct law, not just an alternative that the state courts might have legitimately rejected.
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Thus, the dissenters took the position that an incorrect judgment
may violate federal antitrust law and, accordingly, that its enforcement
may be enjoined. While appellate review by the Supreme Court of the
federal law issues technically was unavailable because the state court
defendants had withdrawn their federal defenses, the dissenters sug-
gested that this withdrawal must be permissible if exclusive jurisdiction
is to have full meaning. In addition, the four dissenters suggested that
it was wise to withdraw the federal issues from the state suit because
the Illinois state courts had been slow in deciding the case. In princi-
ple, the dissenters thus approved the immediate attempt by a state court
defendant to obtain federal injunctive relief before the state claim
should go to judgment. The dissenters relied, therefore, on the federal
courts' exclusive jurisdiction over the federal law issues in Lektro-
Vend. The Court's earlier decisions in the Lektro- Vend tradition, how-
ever, did not carry that limitation. Lektro- Vend is a strong reminder
that Atlantic Coast's rigidity 169 is misleading.
Their analysis does share a difficulty with Wells Fargo. If the state court has applied the
wrong standard, its judgment might be viewed as inequitable only if the defendant has no
opportunity to seek Supreme Court review. In Lektro- Vend, the defendants were not denied
this opportunity; they renounced it and instead sought duplicative proceedings. But the dis-
sent can be supported on the grounds that state courts cannot make a binding disposition of
the antitrust issue because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
under the antitrust laws. Accordingly, a party may forego a federal defense and present it as
an equitable claim after an unfavorable state judgment has been rendered. If the other party
could force state court litigation of antitrust issues through the device of a breach of contract
suit, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction would be circumvented. Direct review of antitrust
defenses by the Supreme Court does not equal the type of enforcement envisioned by Con-
gress when it granted exclusive jurisdiction over these claims to the lower federal courts.
The Court has not yet ruled on the res judicata effect of state court judgments when
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a class of claims. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins.
Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, The Securities Exchange Act
and the Rule of Federal Jurisdiction, 89 YALE L.J. 98 (1979). Of course, in Lektro- Vend, the
Court's ultimate disposition protected the state court judgment from collateral review.
The dissenters in Lektro- Vend went beyond Wells Fargo in one respect. In Wells
Fargo, the state and federal courts disagreed upon a legal issue; the state court judgment was
inequitable because it rested upon an "incorrect" interpretation of the law. In Lektro- Vend,
the dissenters would require the district court to wrestle with a difficult factual or mixed law-
fact question: whether a restrictive covenant was an unreasonable restraint of trade. For a
discussion of the complex questions in such a decision, see Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected
Stepchild" A Proposal For Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1973). Federal intervention might impose a heavy burden on the
district court to make time-consuming factual inquiries that either had been made or could
have been made in the state court. The federal plaintiff in Lektro- Vend ultimately did not
obtain his federal injunction; but the fragmentation of the Court indicates that Wells Fargo
may retain some vitality inasmuch as the dissenters thought a "wrong" choice of law could
be enjoined by a federal trial court.
169. See notes 143-45 & accompanying text supra.
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Equitable Intervention into Criminal Proceedings
The courts have discouraged overlapping litigation that is purely
civil in nature. This general distaste has given way at times to curb
inequitable proceedings. Similarly, in the context of criminal proceed-
ings that overlap or promise to overlap with civil proceedings, the
courts have avoided duplicative litigation, but have remained sensitive
to the potential for inequity in the conduct of litigation. The courts
have shown reluctance to enjoin pending criminal charges.' 70 Difficult
factual questions relating to guilt or innocence make preliminary relief
unattractive. When criminal charges are only threatened, however, the
courts have shown a greater willingness to intrude.' 7' A threat of pros-
ecution may not only stifle conduct, but also may deny the citizen
meaningful judicial review of questionably valid criminal statutes. The
vexing policy questions raised in these situations had received only ten-
tative consideration by the state courts when the Supreme Court began
to grant equitable relief on a broad basis.' 72
Equitable Relief: General Considerations and Early Development in the
State Courts
Equity generally refused to enjoin a previously instituted criminal
case. 173 The suitor was thought to have an adequate remedy at law,
that is, to interpose his or her defenses in the criminal trial. 174 Not only
did law provide the suitor an adequate remedy, but equity. lacked the
170. See Sherod v. Aitchison, 71 Or. 446, 142 P. 351 (1914); J.W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner,
122 Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622 (1909).
171. E.g., Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 P. 523 (1915).
172. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
173. For instances where criminal charges were brought, see Liu v. Varr, 39 Hawaii 23
(1950); Yates v. Village of Batavia, 79 I1. 500 (1875); State ex rel. City of New Orleans, 48
La. Ann. 448, 21 So. 28 (1896); Wallack v. Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delin-
quents, 67 N.Y. 23 (1876); West v. Mayor of New York, 10 Paige 539 (N.Y. Ch. 1844);
Lockward v. Baird, 59 N.D. 713, 231 N.W. 851 (1930); Kelly v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123
S.W. 622 (1909); Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864 (1905); Lord Montague v.
Dudman, 28 Eng. Rep. 253 (Ch. 1751); Holderstaffe v. Saunders, 87 Eng. Rep. 780 (Q.B.
1703); Z. CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES 224-270 (1939); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 2.11, 7.4 (1973); 1 J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
INJUNCTONS §§ 68, 273 (3rd ed. 1890); H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY § 173 (1948); 1 T. SPELLING, A TREATISE ON INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER Ex-
TRAOP)rINARY REMEDIES §§ 24, 71 (2d ed. 1901); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 893 (12th ed. 1977); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Intefer-
ence with State Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53
N.C. L. REv. 591, 597-616 (1975); Developments in the Law, Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv.
994, 1024-27 (1965); Annot., 1916C L.R.A. 263 (1916).
174. See, e.g., Thompson v. Van Lear, 77 Ark. 506, 92 S.W. 773 (1906); Phillips v.
Mayor of Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 386 (1878); Ewing v. Webster City, 103 Iowa 226, 72
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ability to give complete relief because the chancellor had no power to
punish for violations of the criminal code. 1 75 Consideration of the mer-
its of the suitor's bill might duplicate the law courts' determinations. 1
76
If a suitor would prevail with the arguments that could be presented as
a defense in the law court, the chancellor might give relief and con-
clude the dispute. If, however, all the suitor's arguments would be un-
persuasive, the chancellor was unable to try the general issue and was
obliged to send the suitor back to the law courts, where the case would
be reconsidered. The suitor might then raise as defenses the arguments
rejected by the chancellor. This process would delay whatever con-
demnation and punishment the accused might deserve. Rather than
risk lengthy and possibly duplicative efforts, equity required the peti-
tioner to present his or her case to the one forum that could provide a
complete resolution of the dispute.
Equity's rigidity could be lessened in practice through the use of
pretrial habeas corpus. If the criminal defendant needed speedy relief
on a controlling legal issue, pretrial habeas corpus provided relief by
freeing a prisoner from illegal detention. 177 For example, an unconsti-
tutional statute 78 or an insufficient indictment 179 would render deten-
tion illegal and accordingly warrant the grant of pretrial habeas
corpus.180 Through habeas corpus, a prisoner had an important device
to halt his or her prosecution.
Habeas corpus also was limited. The defendant had to be held in
custody, a requirement not satisfied if he or she had been released on
bail. 18 In addition, the writ was of no use for one concerned about the
N.W. 511 (1897); Sherod v. Aitchison, 71 Or. 446, 142 P. 351 (1914); Kelly v. Conner, 122
Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622 (1909); Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864 (1905).
The availability of pretrial habeas corpus, see text accompanying notes 177-83 infra,
would also preclude injunctive relief. See Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 App. Div.
242, 194 N.Y.S. 225, afl'd, 234 N.Y. 542, 138 N.E. 439 (1922).
175. See Hemsley v. Myers, 45 F. 283 (C.C.D. Kan. 1891); Suess v. Noble, 31 F. 855
(C.C.S.D. Iowa 1887); Liu v. Farr, 39 Hawaii 23 (1950).
176. See Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864 (1905); Note, Injunction Against
Search by Police Officers, 25 MIcH. L. REv. 892 (1927).
177. For detailed treatments, see W. CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS §§ 230-38 [hereinafter
cited as CHURCH] (1884); Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1885, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
243, 258-61 (1965).
178. See Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
179. See In re Corryell, 22 Ga. 178 (1863); Exparte Prince, 27 Fla. 196, 9 So. 659 (1891);
Inre Dassler, 35 Kan. 678, 12 P. 130 (1886); In re Prime, 1 Barb. Ch. 340 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1847).
180. The prisoner could also employ habeas corpus as a device to obtain release on bail.
See CHURCH, supra note 177, § 233.
181. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339 (1920).
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legality of contemplated future conduct. Even if a person were willing
to take an action that would result in custody, a favorable decision and
a grant of the writ would have no res judicata effect to protect similar
conduct in the future. 182 Finally, habeas corpus would be of no practi-
cal value to a corporation concerned about its rights under the law.
8 3
By the end of the nineteenth century, equity began to allow chal-
lenges to penal laws by those who were threatened with criminal prose-
cution.184 If no prosecution was pending, equitable relief posed no
threat of duplicative proceedings. More importantly, the threat of the
criminal process can stifle conduct that may have legitimate claims to
protection. 8 5
182. See CHURCH, supra note 177, § 386a.
183. The corporation might often be unable to find an employee who would be willing
to expose himself or herself to prosecution. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145 (1908).
184. See Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N. R.R., 84 Ala. 115, 4 So. 106 (1887); Sullivan
v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co., 148 Cal. 368, 83 P. 156 (1905); City of Atlanta v. Gate
City Gas Light Co., 71 Ga. 106 (1883); City of Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299, 272 S.W.
748 (1925); New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co. v. City of New Orleans, 118 La. 228,
42 So. 784 (1907); Mayor v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878); Sylvester Coal Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 130 Mo. 323, 32 S.W. 649 (1895) (municipal ordinance); Continental Oil Co. v. City
of Santa Fe, 25 N.M. 94, 177 P. 742 (1918); Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. ch. 425
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852); City of Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330,28 S.W. 528
(1894); Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 P. 523 (1915); see also Annot., 1916C
L.R.A. 263 (1916).
Whether a proceeding is pending or merely threatened is examined in P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1023-24 (2d ed. 1973).
185. A hypothetical case demonstrates the justification for awarding equitable relief
against a threatened prosecution. X has conducted a business in which, as part of his norfnal
operation, he engages in certain activity on a regular basis. X seriously doubts the validity
of newly enacted legislation that would regulate this conduct. The district attorney immedi-
ately informs him that prosecution will follow if he should continue the proscribed activity.
X is placed in a dilemma: if he ceases, he gives up or renders less profitable a valuable
enterprise. By foregoing his conduct, he foregoes all realistic opportunity to challenge the
suspect legislation. He has little prospect of a successful legal action against any government
official for the damage done to his business. Government officials whom he might sue for
damages will assert official immunity as a defense in any suit for damages. See Theis, Offi-
cial Immunity andthe Civil RightsAct, 38 LA. L. REV. 281 (1978). They may also prevail on
an alternative argument that X should have tested the law in a criminal prosecution and
should not have backed away from confrontation so quickly. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S.
163 (1908). Even if he should obtain a civil judgment at law, it might remain unsatisfied if
the right that X claims is a valuable one. Traditionally, the inability of the defendant to pay
a judgment at law strengthened the plaintiffs case for equitable relief. See H. McCLIN-
TOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 47 (2d ed. 1948).
That someone else may be so bold as to violate the law and win a victory in a criminal
case is also problematic. If, he violates the legislation, on the other hand, he makes himself
an accused criminal and exposes himself to possible conviction and punishment. The bur-
dens of being an accused criminal may not be worth the risk. X may receive no definitive
treatment of his legal argument in a criminal case. The case may be decided in his favor, but
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Equitable relief was available even though actual threats of prose-
cution were not communicated to the citizen who questioned a penal
statute, 186 although actual threats make the strongest claim on the
chancellor's conscience. The existence of new legislation that clearly
prohibits a citizen's conduct should assure the court that the citizen has
a genuine grievance. 187 When a citizen has received no actual threats,
however, and claims a threat from old statutes never enforced or from
new statutes that seem to have no bearing on his or her conduct, the
court may be reluctant to grant relief.
88
Additionally, it is not necessary that the legislation interfere with
property or business rights. The older cases sometimes carried this sug-
gestion,189 but it has not been followed. 190 It is clear today that courts
will give equitable relief when nonproperty rights are involved. 191
Two recent Supreme Court cases demonstrate that equity will
grant relief against a prospective prosecution. 92 In Abbott Laboratories
on narrow grounds that do not bear on his main concern. Indeed, a single violation, to
provide a "test case," which may not be treated as a test case, brings all the disabilities of the
criminal process, but may require, possibly for a number of months or even years, forbear-
ance from the conduct in question. To continue business as usual, to engage in repeated
violations, and to defend numerous prosecutions, increases his difficulties to a level that
most prudent persons would find unacceptable. By their nature, then, threats of the invoca-
tion of the criminal process do not provide the adequate remedy at law, which the pending
criminal proceeding may provide. Hence, equity has sought to relieve the individual from
the dilemma that threats present.
186. E.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Sandelin v. Collins, I Cal. 2d 147, 33 P.2d 1009 (1934); Adams v.
Slavin, 225 Ky. 135, 7 S.W.2d 836 (1928); Bank of Yorktown v. Boland, 280 N.Y. 673, 21
N.E.2d 191 (1939). But see Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action,
52 YALE L.J. 445 (1943).
187. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923).
188. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
189. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330, 28 S.W. 528
(1894); cf. Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818) (originating the notion that equity
protects only property rights). Effective criticism of the doctrine originating in Gee appears
in Pound, Equitable RehiefAgainst Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV.
640 (1916).
190. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915) (employment at will a property
right); City of Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299, 272 S.W. 748 (1915) (employment to
deliver speeches a property right).
191. See Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946); Smith v.
State, 242 So. 2d 692 (Miss. 1970); Covarrubia v. Butler, 502 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973); Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 P. 523 (1915); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co.,
248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978), afdon other grounds, 443 U.S. 97 (1979). But see Cantrell v.
Mayor of Mt. Airy, 218 Ga. 646, 129 S.E.2d 910 (1963); State v. Eubanks, 368 P.2d 253
(Okla. Crim. 1962).
192. This analysis is not peculiar to a threat of criminal proceedings. Possible adminis-
trative sanctions create similar dilemmas for the citizen, and the courts have accordingly
granted injunctive relief. In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407
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v. Gardner,193 manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs sought injunc-
tive and declaratory relief against a labeling regulation promulgated by
the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. They as-
serted that the regulation exceeded the scope of congressional delega-
tion of power. Were they to fail to comply with the regulation, they
would be subject to criminal and civil actions. The Court granted the
relief sought.
If petitioners wish to comply they must change all their labels, adver-
tisements, and promotional materials; they must destroy stocks of
printed matter; and they must invest heavily in new printing type and
new supplies. The alternative to compliance... may be even more
costly. That course would risk serious criminal and civil penalties for
the unlawful distribution of "misbranded" drugs.1
94
The Court granted relief even though the Solicitor General had dis-
avowed the government's intent to invoke the criminal process to ad-
vance its position. A "threat" existed when the suit was filed because
the proposed conduct clearly violated legal norms and the petitioners
had no reason to believe the government would ignore the violations.
In Ostereich v. Selective Service System, 195 the Court gave similar
protection to first amendment rights. The plaintiff, a divinity student,
had been granted an exemption from military service. When he re-
turned his registration certificate to his local draft board to express dis-
sent from United States military policies, his local draft board ordered
him to report for induction into the armed services. By statute, no judi-
cial review might be had of a local board decision, except as a defense
to a criminal prosecution for failure to obey the induction order.
196 It
was conceded that an inductee might also obtain review by habeas
corpus after he had submitted to induction and found himself in mili-
(1942), the plaintiff, a radio network, attacked Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
regulations that would have drastically altered the network's relationship with its members.
The FCC regulations declared that the Commission would deny a license or renewal of a
license to an individual station unless that station's contract with its network met certain
conditions. The CBS standard contract materially deviated from the FCC guidelines.
Before the regulations became effective, CBS began to receive word from individual stations
that they intended to abrogate or not to renew their contracts with CBS. The Court ap-
proved the availability of injuncitve relief to test the regulations. Licensing proceedings
would not give the network adequate relief. The threat of loss of license was so severe that
compliance was more likely than challenge. When the government has created a potent
disincentive to violate its standards, the citizen may appropriately challenge these standards
without violating them.
193. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
194. Id. at 152-53.
195. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
196. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 451 (1967).
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tary custody.1 97 Nonetheless, the Court approved injunctive relief.
The board had no statutory authority to strip the plaintiff of his exemp-
tion in retaliation for dissent. Because the board's action was clearly
lawless, the Court could neither countenance the delay of postinduction
review nor be persuaded that Congress intended to delay review in
such a case. A criminal proceeding was "threatened" because the peti-
tioner desired a course of conduct to which a criminal penalty was at-
tached and for which it would likely be invoked. The Court considered
unfair the proposition that a person must invite prosecution to deter-
mine his or her rights.1 98
With some uniformity, the cases have confined injunctive relief to
those situations in which the plaintiff can demonstrate that the chal-
lenged law is unconstitutional or in no way applies to his or her con-
duct.199 The courts attempt to avoid a decision that rests upon an
assessment of facts, even stipulated facts, that would present a question
of fact about the suitor's guilt or innocence. 2°° If the question
presented to the chancellor is factual, his or her judgment may do little
to clarify the statute. Distaste for proliferation of litigation explains an
equity court's refusal to make factual determinations.20' Unless the
suitor can present the chancellor with a clearly severable legal issue
that promises to sanction the suitor's conduct, the chancellor has little
reason to interfere with a controversy more easily settled in criminal
court.2 0 2
Moreover, a court may be reluctant to grant equitable relief when
"consideration of the underlying legal issues would necessarily be facil-
itated if they were raised in the context of a specific attempt to en-
force" 20 3 the challenged provisions. Unless a court can foresee the
implications of a proposed declaration of invalidity, it may prefer to
hold back its relief until relief is absolutely necessary. A general decla-
ration of invalidity may impair unforeseeable applications of a statute
that are permissible and desirable.
197. 393 U.S. at 238.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. Ch. 425 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1852);
Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 P. 523 (1915).
200. Eg., Davis v. ASPCA, 75 N.Y. 362 (1878).
201. E.g., Mills Novelty Co. v. Sunderman, 266 N.Y. 32, 193 N.E. 541 (1934); Troy
Amusement Co. v. Attenweiller, 137 Ohio St. 460, 30 N.E.2d 799 (1940).
202. See Joyner v. Hammond, 199 Iowa 919, 200 N.W. 571 (1924); Harmon v. Police
Commissioner, 274 Mass. 56, 174 N.E. 198 (1931); Municipal Telegraph Co. v. McCreary,
77 N.Y.S. 409 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Note, Injunction Against Search By Police Officers, 25 MicH.
L. REV. 892 (1927).
203. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 171 (1967).
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Distinguishing between questions of law and questions of fact may
be difficult. 2°4 When the suitor makes no attack on the statute, but
merely alleges that he or she has not violated its provisions, a court's
reluctance to intervene is nearly absolute.205 Charges brought without
evidence can intimidate a citizen and discourage protected and unpro-
tected conduct. Traditionally, the courts have refused to intervene, rea-
soning that only a full trial can determine these issues and that such a
trial would duplicate criminal proceedings. A minority of courts refuse
to enjoin a threatened prosecution unless the suitor challenges the con-
stitutionality of the law; they refuse to entertain a claim that the statute
does not extend to the suitor's conduct.20 6 A majority of courts, how-
ever, will consider all legal attacks on the statute,207 and will not be
confined to certain constitutional claims.
20 8
Suits for injunctive relief from criminal prosecution may arise in
one of two circumstances: when a prosecution is pending with no
others threatened and when a prosecution is threatened with no others
pending. "Hybrid" situations, however, present more difficult and
more realistic problems. The suitor may file for equitable relief and
then have charges lodged against him or her. Alternatively, while
faced with pending charges, the suitor, desiring to engage in the same
conduct again, may pursue an injunction.
The situation in which a suitor files for equitable relief and then
has charges lodged against him or her has arisen frequently. If the eq-
uity suit raises the same issues that the citizen would present as a de-
fense in the criminal court, equitable relief could issue on the theory
that the court first to obtain jurisdiction should retain the jurisdiction to
the exclusion of other courts.209 This course of action could produce
duplication if the chancellor should reject the suitor's arguments, which
could be presented again as a defense to the criminal charges. None-
theless, when the suitor wishes to pursue a continuing course of con-
duct, an equitable remedy would provide certainty regarding future
conduct. A pending charge does not answer immediate questions
204. Compare Fein v. Local Bd., 405 U.S. 365 (1972) with Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256
(1968).
205. If no evidence supported the charge, a prisoner might avail himself or herself of
pretrial habeas corpus. See CHURCH, supra note 177, §§ 236-37; see also cases cited in note
202 supra.
206. See Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 113 F. 616, 625 (6th Cir. 1902).
207. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
208. See New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co. v. City of New Orleans, 118 La. 228,
42 So. 784 (1907).
209. See Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 26 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1742). But see Saull v.
Browne, 10 L.R.-Ch. App. 64 (1874).
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about proposed conduct, which the suitor might abandon to avoid fur-
ther charges.
In most of the early state cases, the suitor had been charged and
convicted before he or she sought injunctive relief.210 Denying injunc-
tions, the courts reasoned that the citizen's appeal was an adequate
remedy, which should not forestall further enforcement during the ap-
peal process. 21' This approach avoids duplicative proceedings, but
may also discourage continued exercise of constitutional or legal rights
after conviction by the trial court.
When a conviction has not yet been entered, an injunction may be
appropriate, even though criminal charges have been filed first. Refus-
ing to grant an injunction would ignore the potency of the criminal
penalty to enforce regulation of business practices that may occur fre-
quently. To deny equitable relief because of a single pending charge
would present the suitor with the dilemma of foregoing irreplaceable
rights or incurring a staggering penalty. The dilemma can be particu-
larly harsh because a pending charge may not necessarily resolve the
crucial issues that would be presented in an equity suit. Thus, although
an injunction may duplicate efforts, the duplication is necessary to free
the suitor from a peril that the pending proceedings do not dispel.
Treatment of the hybrid cases had not received comprehensive treat-
ment by the state courts when the federal courts began to take the lead
to this area.
212
210. See Mayor of Moultrie v. Patterson, 109 Ga. 370, 34 S.E. 600 (1899); Philips v.
Mayor of Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 386 (1878); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Ottawa, 148
Ill. 397, 36 N.E. 85 (1894); Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 Ill. 111 (1887); Ewing v.
Webster City, 103 Iowa 226, 72 N.W. 511 (1897).
211. One court explicitly approved further prosecutions if there should be further viola-
tions during this period. Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 Ill. 111 (1887).
If a conviction relieves a citizen of the dilemma of an untested law, denying the injunc-
tion may be satisfactory. Although the citizen may not agree with the trial court's conclu-
sion, the uncertainty has been reduced. The suitor's continued disagreement may be
reviewed by appeal. However, the convictions in these cases were often entered by a justice
of the peace, whose conviction perhaps should not preclude equitable relief. See Ostrahder
v. Linn, 237 Iowa 694, 22 N.W.2d 223 (1946). Even if the justice of the peace has the power
to invalidate a statute, he or she is unlikely to make new law or even to appreciate legal
arguments. See, e.g., Lecates v. Justice of the Peace Court, 637 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1980). A
conviction in these circumstances might say very little about the worth of the citizen's legal
arguments.
212. Modem state court decisions have shown an unwillingness to intervene in hybrid
situations, but seem to have assumed that the prosecution was truly a test case: The defend-
ant would be prosecuted only for violations commencing after a determination of the law's
validity. See Grimm v. County Comm'rs, 252 Md. 626, 250 A.2d 866 (1969); Norsica v.
Board of Selectmen, 368 Mass. 161, 330 N.E.2d 830 (1975).
The adoption of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. III 1979), had
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Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings
When federal courts are asked to interfere in state criminal pro-
ceedings, the intervention may lead to duplication, but may be neces-
sary to avoid inequity. The Supreme Court has freely granted relief,
using doctrines that state courts hesitated to adopt. In its decisions, the
Court has relied heavily on the principles developed in the context of
overlapping civil suits.
Historically, federal intervention was not wholeheartedly ac-
cepted. The Court's treatment of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
over state prisoners showed its willingness to allow state proceedings to
continue and vindicate the prisoner's claims.213 In Exparte Royall,
214
the prisoner had been indicted for selling tax coupons without a license.
Although free on bond for a year, he had surrendered himself to state
custody and sought federal habeas corpus, 215 claiming that the state
statute he allegedly violated deprived him of property rights without
due process of law. The Court acknowledged that the federal habeas
corpus statute2 6 clearly granted power to entertain and dispose of his
contention that the state statute was unconstitutional, but qualified its
finding:
The [statutory] injunction to hear the case summarily. . . does not
deprive the court of discretion. . . which. . . should be exercised in
little material effect upon the practice already examined in this section. The courts have
granted or denied declarations to the same extent that they would grant or deny injunctions.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Trimble, 519 P.2d 1352 (Okla. 1974); see also Colorado State Bd. v.
Rico, 132 Colo. 437, 289 P.2d 162 (1955); Staub v. Baxley, 211 Ga. 1, 83 S.E.2d 606 (1954).
If a prosecution is pending, a declaration would prove as duplicative as an injunction.
E.., Updegraff v. Attorney General, 298 Mich. 48, 298 N.W. 400 (1941); Moresh v.
O'Regan, 122 N.J. Eq. 388, 192 A. 831 (1937). But see Watson v. Centro Espanal De
Tampa, 158 Fla. 796, 30 So.2d 288 (1947). In those jurisdictions that require actual threats
of enforcement, the declaration route is an improvement, because it gives relief without the
necessity of showing an actual communication by the prosecutor. See Borchard, Challenging
'Tenal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445 (1943).
213. Initially, the federal courts had no statutory authority to release a state prisoner
through the device of habeas corpus. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81. The
federal courts insisted that state courts must not interfere with federal custody of a prisoner.
See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). The Civil War and Reconstruction
brought statutory authority to grant to state prisoners federal habeas corpus just as broad as
that administered by the state courts. For an account of this history, see Amsterdam, Crimi-
nal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 793 (1965).
214. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
215. Unless physically in custody, a defendant could not obtain habeas corpus. At that
time, a defendant at large on bail would not meet the custody requirement.
216. Before Royall, the lower federal courts had freely granted pretrial habeas corpus to
state prisoners. Exparte Ah Lit, 26 F. 512 (D. Or. 1886); In re Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal.
1880); Exparte McCready, 15 F. Cas. 1345 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 8732).
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the light of the relations existing, under our system of government,
between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in
recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those rela-
tions be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally
bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution ...
The Circuit Court was not at liberty, under the circumstances dis-
closed, to presume that the decision of the State court would be
otherwise than is required by the fundamental law of the land, or
that it would disregard the settled principles of constitutional law an-
nounced by this court, upon which is clearly conferred the power to
decide ultimately and finally all cases arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
217
The discretion to require exhaustion of state remedies became a rule of
nonintervention with few exceptions. 218 While an injunction against
pending criminal charges would be expected to be unavailable, the
breadth of the Court's language also cast doubt on the use of injunctive
relief against threatened prosecutions or its use in hybrid situations.
219
Early cases in the lower federal courts denied the power to enjoin
pending state prosecutions,2 20 stating the traditional doctrine that a
pending prosecution offers an adequate remedy at law and that federal
proceedings would duplicate the work of the state courts. Moreover,
federal injunctive relief raises special problems for the suitor. Unless
diversity jurisdiction is established, the suitor must claim that prosecu-
tion is not merely inequitable, but also unconstitutional. 221 Although
the Constitution may protect the activity proscribed by the state, the
suitor may have difficulty establishing that a trial, which provides a
specific opportunity to present this defense, violates constitutional
rights.222 Even if a pending prosecution would be unconstitutional as
well as inequitable, the Anti-Injunction Act 223 forbids the stay of a pro-
217. 117 U.S. at 251.
218. See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 793, 889 (1965). There were, however, significant exceptions to the non-intervention
rule. Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205 (1908); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
219. See notes 209-12 & accompanying text supra, notes 342-65 & accompanying text
infra.
220. E.g., Hemsley v. Myers, 45 F. 283 (C.C.D. Kan. 1891); Wagner v. Drake, 31 F. 849
(S.D. Iowa 1887).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 gives a cause of action to redress a deprivation of constitutional
rights. It does not grant a right to receive declarations of constitutional rights apart from a
finding of deprivation. Nor would the general federal question jurisdictional statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), aid a plaintiff unless he or she could allege the unconstitutionality of a
state prosecution. See White v. Sparkill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500 (1930). See generally
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
222. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S.
281 (1970). For a discussion of Adantic Coast, see text accompanying notes 143-45 supra.
223. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
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ceeding pending in a state court.224
In Ex parte Young, 225 the Court developed an argument for fed-
eral "equity jurisdiction" that closely paralleled the state courts' juris-
diction for equitable intervention. In the Court's view, a criminal
prosecution was not the best forum for resolving complex factual is-
sues. Moreover, the stringent criminal penalties enacted prevented the
plaintiffs from "resorting to the courts for the purpose of determining
the validity of such acts, ' 226 because no reasonable person would risk
criminal prosecution. To deny judicial review would be
unconstitutional:
[W]hen the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and
imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers
from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the
result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from
seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights.227
Until judicial review had occurred, the statute's penal sanction and the
threat to enforce it violated due process.228 In addition, the Court
224. Several cases arising shortly after enactment of Reconstruction legislation denied
that these acts authorized an injunction against state court proceedings. See Rhodes & Ja-
cobs Mfg. Co. v. New Hampshire, 70 F. 721 (C.C.D.N.H. 1895); Louisiana v. Lagarde, 60 F.
186 (C.C.E.D. La. 1894); Hemsley v. Myers, 45 F. 283 (C.C.D. Kan. 1891); Wagner v.
Drake, 31 F. 849 (S.D. Iowa 1887); Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 15 F. Cas. 970
(C.C.D. La. 1879) (No. 8541); Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408). Al-
though members of the Reconstruction Congress expressed dissatisfaction with state judicial
machinery, these objections principally related to the state courts' inability and unwilling-
ness to punish Ku Klux Klan members and sympathizers. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 241-43 (1972). In those instances in which legal process was used against citizens de-
serving protection, removal jurisdiction and habeas corpus were the intended remedies. See
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Re-
moval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793
(1965). Habeas corpus had great promise for accomplishing this goal until the Court en-
grafted its qualification in Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), and virtually destroyed the
utility of habeas.
225. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
226. 209 U.S. at 144.
227. Id at 147.
228. "Ordinarily a law creating offenses in the nature of misdemeanors or felonies re-
lates to a subject over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event. In
the case, however, of the establishment of certain rates without any hearing, the validity of
such rates necessarily depends upon whether they are high enough to permit at least some
return upon the investment (how much it is not now necessary to state), and an inquiry as to
that fact is a proper subject ofjudicial investigation. If it turns out that the rates are too low
for that purpose, then they are illegal. Now, to impose upon a party interested the burden of
obtaining a judicial decision of such a question (no prior hearing having ever been given)
only upon the condition that if unsuccessful he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines as
provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and thus prevent
any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and
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stated that a "test case" arising out of a single violation would not be an
adequate remedy at law.
229
The Exparte Young Court did not inquire into the possible availa-
bility of state injunctive relief. If a state provides its own injunctive
relief, the presence of untested penal legislation should not stifle a
plaintiff's proposed conduct. He or she can seek pre-enforcement relief
from the state courts. Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
deprivations of civil rights, and may not defer to state courts.230 If state
injuntive relief is available, however, the state has not deprived the citi-
zen of pre-enforcement judicial review. Although the Court may have
assumed that the Minnesota state court would not provide full equita-
ble relief, especially if the plaintiff were to violate the law after it filed
suit,231 it made no explicit judgments about the quality of state
remedies.
The Court did resolve a difficult question. After the federal in-
junction had been granted,232 the state attorney general sought manda-
therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious between a case where the validity of the act
depends upon the existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of a
very complicated and technical character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a subject
requiring no such investigation and over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete
in any event.
"We hold, therefore, that the provisions of the acts relating to the enforcement of the
rates, either for freight or passengers, by imposing such enormous fines and possible impris-
onment as a result of an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are
unconstitutional on their face, without regard to the question of the insufficiency of those
rates." 209 U.S. at 147-48.
229. "But in the event of a single violation the prosecutor might not avail himself of the
opportunity to make the test, as obedience to the law was thereafter continued, and he might
think it unnecessary to start an inquiry. If, however, he should do so while the company was
thereafter obeying the law, several years might elapse before there was a final determination
of the question, and if it should be determined that the law was invalid the property of the
company would have been taken during that time without due process of law, and there
would be no possibility of its recovery." Id at 163.
230. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
231. See Milton Dairy Co. v. Great N. Ry., 124 Minn. 239, 144 N.W. 764 (1914). But
see State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 130 Minn. 144, 148, 153 N.W. 320, 321 (1915).
Once the Court granted preliminary relief in Young, the Minnesota court cooperated
fully with the Supreme Court's review of the legislation. The Minnesota court refused to
punish violators of the statute for violations committed during the period of federal review.
See notes 239-44 & accompanying text infra.
232. Were the plaintiff allowed to gain entrance merely for a declaration of constitu-
tional rights, the analysis could have been cleaner and more persuasive. The plaintiff could
dispense with the contention that threatened enforcement was a violation of constitutional
rights and concentrate on the proposition that the statute itself was unconstitutional. The
plaintiff would have then been required to demonstrate that he or she lacked an adequate
federal remedy at law. See DiGiovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64 (1935);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The plaintiff could easily satisfy this latter requirement
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mus to force the railroads into compliance with state rate laws. Thus,
Ex parte Young presented a hybrid situation. Although a threat of
prosecution under an arguably invalid law may be unconstitutional, the
filing of an enforcement action in the state courts arguably is not un-
constitutional. A mandamus suit provides for judicial review, while the
claim of unconstitutionality had been premised on the absence of re-
view. Rather than suggest that the filing of the mandamus suit was
unconstitutional, the Court invoked the rule that the court first seized
of the dispositive issues obtained exclusive jurisdiction of the case. As
an equal to the state courts, the federal court might retain jurisdiction
and exclude interlopers.2 3 As the reasonableness of rates had been put
in issue in the federal court, that court had the power to forestall con-
sideration of the issue in another court.
The Court further stated that it would not have allowed interven-
tion "in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a state
court. ' '234 This dictum apparently rested on the Court's interpretation
of the Anti-Injunction Act.2 5 This remark at least forbids intervention
in a pending case; it at most forbids any intervention, even of
threatened prosecutions, if a prosecution should be pending against the
suitor at the time of the federal filing. Under a broad view of duplica-
tive litigation, the first-filed rule would mandate federal deference to
the earlier state case. This broad view would reward a perspicacious
suitor who, as in Exparte Young, sues before any violations occur and
thereby provide the basis of a pending prosecution.236
because, obviously, the plaintiff would not be criminally prosecuted in federal court. Nor
would federal habeas corpus be available when a violation had yet to occur.
If the suit had fallen within the Court's diversity jurisdiction, a similar analysis could
have been employed. Diversity jurisdiction was not established. 209 U.S. at 143.
233. 209 U.S. at 160; accord, Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R., 247 U.S. 214 (1918); Prout
v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888) (dictum).
234. 209 U.S. at 162.
235. The Court cited two cases. In Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148 (1898), the Court
refused to intervene in a pending criminal proceeding because the Anti-Injunction Act for-
bade intervention. Harkrader also examined whether the federal proceedings were so re-
lated that they ousted the state court's jurisdiction. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366
(1872) did not involve the Act; rather, the Court applied the familiar first-in-time rule as
developed in the case law. 209 U.S. at 162.
236. In State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 130 Minn. 144, 153 N.W. 320 (1915), the
Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized the nature of the right protected and the effect of the
relief granted in Exparte Young. After the federal court's injunction had issued, a railroad
employee was convicted of violating the rate statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction and granted the employee an absolute defense for any violations com-
mitted during the injunction's term. Id Only offenses committed subsequent to the
dissolution of the injunction could be punished. Because the penal provisions had been
ruled unconstitutional, at least for the interim, "the effect of the injunction was to suspend
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Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Exparte Young is its con-
tinuation of the unquestioned assumption that state and federal courts
are fungible. The court neither assumes the superiority of federal
courts in the vindication of federal rights, nor discerns a congressional
intent that the federal forum be preferred because of its federal na-
ture. 237 Rather, the Court transposes to a federal question case the
same principles it had elaborated in diversity cases during the previous
century.
238
In Exparte Young, the lower federal court had enjoined the rail-
road from charging the rates ordained by state law. The rates eventu-
ally were approved, 239 but those who violated the law's prohibitions in
the interim received complete immunity for their actions. This immu-
nity illustrates the scope of Exparte Young's ruling. If the statute were
unconstitutional until pre-enforcement review had occurred, violators
during this interim period could not be fairly punished.240 It would be
futile to grant pre-enforcement review if the suit's ultimate failure
would expose the suitor to the crushing burdens he or she was attempt-
ing to avoid through the use of the pre-enforcement review.
The grant of immunity during the injunctive suit is a controversial
doctrine. If the law is ultimately found valid, as in Exparte Young, the
suitor has engaged in antisocial behavior and has frustrated govern-
mental policy, for which he or she will receive no punishment.241 For
this reason, a bad faith injunctive suit in which the claims are frivolous
will not support a grant of immunity.242 Even if non-frivolous, the
claims must be pressed with reasonable dispatch.243 Finally, an ad-
verse decision on these claims denies immunity for conduct occurring
for the time being the operation of the statute." Id at 150, 153 N.W. at 322; cf. Hunter v.
Wood, 209 U.S. 205 (1907) (petitioner discharged on habeas corpus).
237. The Court did not set forth the inadequacy of state courts, a line of analysis it
would later pursue in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). For a discussion of Michum,
see notes 285-89 & accompanying text infra.
238. See notes 48-67 & accompanying text supra.
239. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
240. Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 669 (1915); Louisville v. N. R.R. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 157 F. 944 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1907); City of Marysville v. Cities Serv. Oil
Co., 133 Kan. 692, 3 P.2d 1060 (1931); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 130 Minn. 144, 153
N.W. 320 (1915); Coal & Coke Ry. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613 (1910); Note,
Constitutional Law--Methods of Testing the Constitutionality of Rate Statutes Involving
Heavy Penalties, 26 MICH. L. REV. 415 (1928).
241. See Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 IU. 111 (1887).
242. See State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699,70 P. 1051 (1902); Derby Oil Co. v. City of Oxford,
134 Kan. 59, 4 P.2d 435 (1931).
243. See Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 669 (1915).
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during the suitor's appeal to a higher court.244 Hedged with these limi-
tations, immunity provides the only meaningful protection for a citizen
who desires to challenge a law that puts him or her in an unfair
dilemma.
Exparte Young could have been limited to its facts. The Court
stressed two distinctive factors: (1) the penalties, even for a single vio-
lation, were severe; and (2) the constitutional challenge to the substan-
tive provisions of the statute depended on factual analysis more
suitable for equity proceedings than for trial by jury.24 5 Later cases,
however, agreed that the prospect of criminal proceedings, not the spe-
cific penalties involved, presented the suitor with an unconstitutional
dilemma: a choice between the criminal process and valuable rights.246
Moreover, a challenge to a law need not require the special fact-finding
ability of a chancellor. Later cases granted injunctive relief on an ex-
anmation of clear-cut legal issues in no way dependent upon factual
analysis.247
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co. ,248 a 1927 case, is the zenith of federal
intervention in state criminal proceedings. The state district attorney
had filed an information in state court against the plaintiff, and a state
grand jury was considering additional indictments. The prosecutor
also threatened additional suits, including a suit for forfeiture of a cor-
porate franchise. The lower federal court enjoined all state proceed-
ings, both pending and threatened. The Court, quoting its dictum in
Exparte Young, disapproved the injunction as applied to the pending
prosecution.249 As applied to the threatened prosecutions, however, it
held that the plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law and deserved the
prompt intervention of equity.25 0 The Court then proceeded to the
merits and held the state penal statute unconstitutional. 251 Although
the district attorney was not enjoined from prosecuting the pending
proceeding, he would, if prudent, disengage himself from a prosecution
destined to fail.2
52
Frink Dairy illustrates the ambiguity in the doctrine that when one
244. See id
245. 209 U.S. at 163-66.
246. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
247. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
248. 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
249. Id at 453.
250. Id.
251. Id at 465.
252. Were he to continue, an injunction might later be permissible. See Weed & Co. v.
Lockwood, 255 U.S. 104 (1921).
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court has jurisdiction of a case, another court may not intervene. The
criminal case and the equity suit are not identical, but the crucial issues
may be identical. In Ex parte Young, the Court held that identity of
crucial issues would give the court first seized of those issues exclusive
jurisdiction. The Frink Court held that only strict identity of the cause
of action would give exclusive jurisdiction. This inconsistency suggests
that federal courts regarded equitable relief as the better vehicle for
testing the application of criminal legislation to prospective or continu-
ing conduct.
The Court's analysis in Ex parte Young suggests that a pending
prosecution is an inadequate remedy for the dilemma created by
threatened prosecution. If a single test case, as in Ex pare Young,
would not relieve the suitor from his or her dilemma, the priority of a
single case in Frink Dairy, perhaps even one to be treated as a test case,
does not necessarily dispel the dilemma.
Dictum in Douglas v. City of Jeannette253 provided the basis for
Younger's eventual departure from the Ex parte Young tradition. In
Douglas, the plaintiffs, Jehovah's Witnesses, attacked a city ordinance
that limited their proselytizing. The Court had invalidated the ordi-
nance in a companion case arising out of a state criminal conviction,
254
but also refused to issue an injunction.
It is a familiar rule that courts of equity do not ordinarily re-
strain criminal prosecutions. No person is immune from prosecution
in good faith for his alleged criminal acts. Its imminence, even
though alleged to be in violation of constitutional guaranties, is not a
ground for equity relief since the lawfulness or constitutionality of
the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based may be
determined as readily in the criminal case as in a suit for an injunc-
tion. . . . Where the threatened prosecution is by state officers for
alleged violations of a state law, . . . the arrest by the federal courts
of the processes of the criminal law within the states, and the deter-
mination of questions of criminal liability under state law by a fed-
eral court of equity, are to be supported only on a showing of danger
of irreparable injury "both great and immediate.
'2 55
Notwithstanding its broad disapproval of federal equitable interven-
tion, including threatened prosecutions, the Court remarked that "we
find no ground for supposing that the intervention of a federal court
. . . will be either necessary or appropriate. '25 6
253. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
254. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
255. 319 U.S. at 163-64.
256. Id at 165. Had the Court desired to make a complete statement of the law, it might
have mentioned the consequences of the state's failure to dismiss its prosecutions. As noted
earlier, continued prosecution after a declaration of invalidity warrants equitable interven-
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In the period between Douglas and Younger, the Court maintained
the analytic framework developed in Exparte Young; it continued to
grant injunctive relief against threatened state prosecutions,257 particu-
larly in the context of state efforts to maintain racial segregation.
258
Dombrowski v. Pfster,259 a 1965 decision, illustrates this pattern.
260
The plaintiffs in Dombrowski were threatened with prosecutions for
failing to register as members of a "Communist-front organization"
and for holding office in a "subversive organization. ' 261 The plaintiffs
asserted that the statutory definitions of these two classes of organiza-
tions were overbroad because they lumped together protected and un-
protected activities. The plaintiffs also asserted that even if the statutes
were constitutional, they did not apply to the plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs had not engaged in unprotected conduct. The plaintiffs de-
nied any attempt to overthrow the government in Louisiana. The de-
fendants were threatening legally and factually unsupportable charges
to frustrate the plaintiffs' attempts to register to vote. The lower court
denied injunctive relief to test these allegations. 262 Plaintiffs were then
indicted.
The Court reversed the denial of an injunction, but failed to for-
mulate a clear doctrine. The Court found no bar in the Anti-Injunction
Act; because the federal suit had been filed first, a federal injunction
could issue after the institution of criminal proceedings.263 The Court
ion, a doctrine affirmed by the Court in an earlier case. See Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255
U.S. 104 (1921). The Court's decision allowed the state freedom to do its duty on the as-
sumption that it would do its duty. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
There was no indication that the prosecutor would continue his efforts once the statute had
been invalidated.
257. Laycock, Federal Inteiference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski For-
got, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 645-59 (1979), assembles a massive collection of cases that
granted federal injunctive relief, notwithstanding Douglas.
258. E.g., Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961), afl'g Bush v. Orleans Parish
School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La.); Louisiana ex rel Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S.
293 (1961); Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959), aj7'g Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp.
944 (E.D. Ark.); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), afl'g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 383 (1954).
259. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
260. Justice Black attempted to distinguish Dombrowski by interpreting it as approving
equitable relief only because the defendants were acting in bad faith. 401 U.S. at 48-49. In
Dombrowski, however, the Court enjoined because the statutes were overbroad. The Court
employed a bad faith analysis to reject an alternative argument that it should have abstained
under Pullman. 380 U.S. at 490.
261. 380 U.S. at 493.
262. 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964).
263. 380 U.S. at 484 n.2. In this respect, the Court followed two basic themes from Ex
parte Young: (1) a plaintiff has the freedom to choose either forum; and (2) the federal
forum, when chosen, may then protect its jurisdiction. Even if the Court had not wished to
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conceded, however, that Douglas264 had ushered in a new era in which
federal courts would assume that state courts and state prosecutors
would uphold the Constitution. To overcome this assumption, the
Court advanced the argument that state court resolution of overbreadth
cases would be inadequate. No single prosecution, even if brought in
good faith, would delimit the statute, and the statute would continue to
chill first amendment rights until it had been fully interpreted.
265
This analysis has a major defect. The Douglas assumption about
the ability of state courts should have led the Court to inquire into the
availability of injunctive and declaratory relief in the state courts. As
did Exparle Young, Dombrowski ignored this important question. The
Court should have treated Douglas as the exceptional case that it is.
The Dombrowski plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutional
until it had been construed and approved. Criminal prosecutions pro-
vided an inadequate review. Until the statute had been approved, no
prosecutions could issue; even after it had been approved, if at all, no
punishments could be meted out for conduct during this review pe-
riod.266 State injunctive remedies were not even considered. If the
Court had tied itself to the Expare Young tradition, its grant of relief
would have made no implicit judgments about the quality of state court
justice. 2
67
The federal cases have granted broad equitable relief, even at the
expense of a coherent approach to duplicative litigation. Only direct
interference with an already pending prosecution was forbidden. The
federal courts did not adjudge the state courts incompetent to decide
these cases.268 Threatened prosecutions were freely enjoined, however,
even when pending prosecutions, which provided an opportunity for
resolution of the legal issues, had been lodged against the suitor in the
interim. This approach treated criminal proceedings realistically, ac-
rely on this doctrine, it could have granted relief against further threatened prosecutions, as
it had in Frink Dairy. 247 U.S. 445 (1927). For a discussion of Frink Dairy, see text accom-
panying note 248 supra.
264. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
265. 380 U.S. at 486-87.
266. Dombrowski approved prosecution for unprotected conduct occurring during judi-
cial review, so long as the statute gave fair warning of the criminality of the conduct later
determined to be unprotected. 380 U.S. at 491 n.7. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 155-56 (1967). Because in the Dombrowski context unprotected conduct would
probably be of a violent nature, the Court's remarks are not at odds with the Young tradition
discussed in the text accompanying notes 239-44 supra.
267. See text accompanying note 233 supra. Justice Harlan severely criticized the Dom-
browski majority for its assumptions about the quality of state court justice. 380 U.S. at 499.
268. Cf. Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246 (1946) (federal injunctive relief effectively sup-
planted state court determination of a factual issue relevant to a federal law issue).
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knowledging that they may not give a quick, authoritative resolution of
important legal issues. It also reflected tolerance for the suitor's free-
dom to select a federal forum. State jurisdiction was concurrent and
hence entitled to no special preference. This framework avoided divi-
sive judgments about the quality of state court justice.
Younger v. Harris
In Younger v. Harris,269 the Court made the most of Dombrowski's
hesitancy to grant relief and further trimmed the reach of federal in-
junctive relief. In Younger, California state authorities indicted Harris
for a violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act270 because
he had publicly distributed certain offensive leaflets. He asserted that
the act violated first and fourteenth amendment rights and inhibited
him in their exercise. The state trial court denied his motion to dismiss
the indictment on these grounds, and the state reviewing courts denied
his requests for an interlocutory writ of prohibition. Harris then sought
injunctive relief in the federal district court. Additional unindicted
plaintiffs joined in Harris' suit because they insisted that the existence
of the statute threatened their exercise of free speech rights, even
though they had received no direct threats from police or prosecutorial
authorities. Although the United States Supreme Court had once up-
held the constitutionality of the challeged statute,27' the three-judge
district court interpreted later precedent 272 as undermining the ruling
and declared the statute unconstitutional.2
73
The district court's opinion was ultimately reversed by the United
States Supreme Court.2 74 The Court summarily rejected the arguments
269. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
270. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11402 (West 1970 & Supp. 1970-1979). Section 11401
declares a felony any act of advocating, teaching,.pr verbally justifying criminal syndicalism
or the use of crime, sabotage, violence, or any unlawful method of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing political or industrial change; knowingly becoming a member of an organiza-
tion whose purpose is to advocate or aid criminal syndicalism; and any act of organizing or
committing acts advocated or taught by the doctrine of criminal syndicalism.
271. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) held that the Act was not unduly vague
and uncertain in its application.
272. The district court noted the development of constitutional concepts of freedom of
expression in the cases of Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) and NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963). 281 F. Supp. at 511-12. The district court also recognized the applicability
of the rule established by Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), that a penal statute
susceptible of sweeping and improper application must be considered as a whole, irrespec-
tive of its limited applicablity to the parties challenging it.
273. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
274. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). After his defeat in the United States
Supreme Court, Harris petitioned the California state courts for pretrial habeas corpus. In
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of the unindicted plaintiffs. Because they had made no charge of actual
threats of prosecution, they did not present a genuine controversy.
Their "imaginary or speculative" fears of state prosecution did not
qualify them as appropriate plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit seeking to
stop the prosecution in state court of another individual.2 75
Regarding Harris' contention, Justice Black, writing for the major-
ity, noted that federal courts traditionally have refused to enjoin pend-
ing state prosecutions. 276  In part, this deference to state criminal
proceedings reflected equity's desire to preserve the jury trial, a major
component of a criminal case, as well as to avoid "duplication of legal
proceedings . . . where a single suit would be adequate to protect the
rights asserted." 277 More importantly, the deference rested upon its
definition of federalism as
the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institu-
tions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways. 278
Thus, an indicted person who seeks a decree that will bar his or
her being brought to trial must allege that further proceedings in crimi-
nal court would cause not only irreparable harm, the traditional pre-
the interim, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), invalidated an Ohio statute and
overruled the Court's earlier decision upholding the California statute, Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Accordingly, the California court, considering itself bound by
Brandenburg, granted habeas corpus and terminated the prosecution. In re Harris, 20 Cal.
App. 3d 632, 97 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1971).
275. 401 U.S. at 42. This branch of Younger is sufficiently elastic that it might fre-
quently bar relief when no prosecution is pending. See Field, The Uncertain Nature of Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 683, 708-10 (1981).
276. "Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few excep-
tions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by
federal courts. In 1793 an Act unconditionally provided: '[N]or shall a writ of injunction be
granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state. . . .' I Stat. 335, ch. 22, § 5. A compari-
son of the 1793 Act with 28 U.S.C. § 2283, its present-day successor, graphically illustrates
how few and minor have been the exceptions granted from the flat, prohibitory language of
the old Act. During all this lapse of years from 1793 to 1970, the statutory exceptions to the
1793 congressional enactment have been only three: (1) 'except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress'; (2) 'where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction'; and (3) 'to protect or effec-
tuate its judgments.' In addition, a judicial exception to the longstanding policy evidenced
by the statute has been made where a person about to be prosecuted in a state court can
show that he will, if the proceeding in the state court is not enjoined, suffer irreparable
damages." 401 U.S. at 43 (citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The Court found
further support for this congressional policy in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
118 (1941). 401 U.S. at 43 n.3.
277. Id at 44.
278. Id
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requisite for equitable relief, but also harm "both great and
immediate. '279 Only rarely can this standard be met; defense of a sin-
gle criminal proceeding usually does not create irreparable injury.
280
To forestall a rapid dismissal of the plea for injunctive relief, a plaintiff
must allege that the prosecutor has proceeded against him or her in bad
faith and for the purpose of harassment, with no "expectation of secur-
ing valid convictions" 281 or that the statute is "flagrantly and patently"
violative of the Constitution "in every clause, sentence, and para-
graph. ' 282 This standard, however, is not met by the assertion that a
statute is void for vagueness or overbreadth. A limiting construction
might leave certain "hard core" conduct properly proscribed. There-
fore, the exception applying to a flagrantly illegal statute, by definition,
cannot come into play when a statute is attacked for vagueness or over-
breadth. Thus, both history and policy precluded federal intervention
in a pending prosecution, except in a most exceptional situation.
283
If the Younger Court had limited its holding to the context of a
single pending indictment and a citizen who does not wish to pursue a
course of conduct, the decision would be clearly correct, although it
would not be as important. Justice Black's reference to "Our Federal-
ism," however, referred to a broader picture, placing in doubt all in-
junctive and declaratory relief against state penal laws.
279. Id at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
Professor Field has correctly noted that a federal Court's inquiry into the impropriety of
equitable relief historically has focused on the availability of federal, not state, remedies at
law. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jun rdction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 683, 705-
06 (1981).
280. "Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of hav-
ing to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not be by themselves considered
'irreparable' in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the plaintiffs feder-
ally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single
criminal prosecution." 401 U.S. at 46.
281. Id at 48 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
282. 401 U.S. at 53 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
283. Although the Younger Court cautioned against a "blind deference to 'States'
rights," 401 U.S. at 44, the highly restrictive language used to describe the rare circum-
stances in which an injunction might issue suggests that federal courts should not enjoin
state prosecutions that may be obvious constitutional violations. On other occasions, the
Court has proceeded further in general disapproval of federal equitable intervention in local
proceedings. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), in response to plaintiffs' complaint of
systematic police brutality directed at members of minority groups, the Supreme Court, stat-
ing that a local government should be granted "the widest latitude in the 'dispatch of its own
internal affairs,"' id at 378-79 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896
(1961)), reversed the lower court judgment that had incorporated a comprehensive program
for improving the handling of citizen complaints alleging police misconduct. It held that the
lower court had improperly "injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary
affairs," 423 U.S. at 380, of a city police department.
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The Court's high regard for and deference to state institutions,
284
including state courts, is particularly hard to evaluate when one consid-
ers its subsequent decision in Mitchum v. Foster.285 In Younger, the
Court refused to consider whether the Anti-Injunction Act barred re-
lief, and declared relief inappropriate because of its regard for state
institutions.2 6 In Mitchum, by contrast, the Court specifically ruled
that civil rights injunctions were not barred by the terms of the Anti-
Injunction Act.287 It recounted legislative history evidencing deep con-
gressional suspicion of the competence and fairness of state courts. The
Congress, reasoned the Court, surely intended to grant the federal
courts power to enjoin state court proceedings that deny federal civil
rights. The Court did not explain how or under what circumstances it
could substitute a high regard for state courts, which Congress had held
in low regard.288 Nor did it explain how Exparte Young had failed to
discover the legislative history on which Aitchum had relied.
28 9
Injunctions Against Pending Criminal Actions
The Court generally has maintained its traditional refusal to en-
join previously instituted criminal charges. Defense of those charges
normally will give the citizen complete relief. The expense and anxiety
resulting from a defense of criminal charges are inevitable. The alter-
native of injunctive relief brings unacceptable social costs. These con-
siderations come into play regardless of whether the criminal
proceeding is state or federal in nature.
290
Younger itself departed from traditional doctrine in allowing the
possibility that injunctions may sometimes issue against prior-filed
criminal charges. 291 As the criminal defendant's proper remedy will
284. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965).
285. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
286. 401 U.S. at 54.
287. 407 U.S. at 242-43.
288. "This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was
altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of
federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those
rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those
rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts." Id at 242.
289. Ex Parte Young had explicitly stated that an injunction may not issue against al-
ready pending state proceedings, 209 U.S. at 162, although the Court did not identify the
source of this prohibition.
290. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (refusal to enjoin court-
martial),
291. Exparte Young ruled out this possibility. 209 U.S. at 161; accord, Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). See text accompanying note 248 supra. Shortly after
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often be pretrial habeas corpus, the scope of injunctive relief is rela-
tively narrow. Injunctive relief will be unavailable when the suitor
seeks release from custody;292 instead, he or she must seek habeas
corpus, which requires exhaustion of available state remedies.2 93 The
Court's broad definition of "custody" 294 further narrows the availabil-
ity of injunctive relief. Thus, a criminal defendant can hope, at best,
for injunctive relief when he or she claims that state proceedings deny
constitutional rights and the defendant desires to restructure those pro-
ceedings, rather than to terminate them or to gain release from
custody.
295
Exhaustion of State Remedies
These narrow limits are illustrated in Gerstein v. Pugh.296 The
plaintiffs were being held to await trial on informations filed by the
district attorney. They alleged a deprivation of their liberty without
due process because no judicial officer had ever made a finding of
Younger, however, the Court decided in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), that in-
junctions under the Civil Rights Act are an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-In-
junction Act. This position had been rejected in prior cases. See note 224 supra. One
modem case had accepted the view that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an exception to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950). Contra, Baines v. City of
Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
In Mitchum, the Court interpreted the legislative history underlyling the Reconstruction
enactments to evince a strong distrust of the state judiciary in civil rights cases. Because of
its distrust, Congress granted equitable remedies that could extend even to pending state
judicial proceedings.
292. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Thus, double jeopardy claims have been
heard in pretrial habeas corpus. E.g., Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1979); Fain
v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973).
293. Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). Once a prisoner exhausts his or her state
remedies, he or she generally may relitigate the constitutional claims in a federal habeas
proceeding. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497-98 (1973).
294. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 298-99; see also Hensley v. Municipal Court,
411 U.S. 345 (1973).
295. The most frequent type of case appears to be a request for the appointment or
allowance of counsel. These cases have not been successful because the state appellate pro-
cess can always hear a denial-of-counsel claim and reverse a conviction, if warranted. Gib-
son v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Rubiera, 539 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1976); Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1972); Inmates of Attica Correctional
Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
When a lawyer has asserted a right to represent the client, the federal courts have con-
sidered his or her arguments on the merits. Bundy v. Rudd, 581 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1978);
Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 439 U.S. 439 (1979) (denying
the asserted right on the merits). It is unclear, after K/ynt, whether a lawyer has any federal
right to appearpro hac vice in a foreign forum. In any event, the Court's disposition on the
merits, especially when the state officials pressed a Younger objection, supports this author's
analysis of Younger. 439 U.S. at 438 n.l.
296. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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probable cause. The prisoners sought not release, but mandatory pre-
liminary hearings.2 97 The Court was willing to consider their argu-
ments on the merits, dismissing in a footnote a Younger objection.
"The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but
only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an
issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.
'298
The plaintiffs were not asking the federal court to abort their trial, but
their entitlement to relief depended on the Court's acceptance of the
debatable proposition that the prisoners were suffering a violation of
constitutional rights and that defense of the pending charges provided
no remedy.
299
The Court's terse discussion does not illuminate the extent of its
holding. The prisoners had state remedies to secure their pretrial re-
lease, but neither remedy was of practical significance. First, one of the
prisoners had a right to release on bail, but had insufficient cash to
meet the bail set for him. Second, Florida courts could grant pretrial
habeas corpus "under exceptional circumstances, ' ' 3°° but because Flor-
ida courts seldom granted a writ of habeas corpus, the Court evidently
regarded this remedy to have no significance, even though neither pris-
oner had applied for habeas corpus relief. Gerstein, then, allowed in-
junctive relief because state courts were highly unlikely to remedy the
constitutional violation.
30'
297. Otherwise, they would have been required to exhaust state court remedies and seek
habeas corpus. Id at 107 n.6. See text accompanying notes 292-93 supra.
298. 420 U.S. at 108 n.9; accord, Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981); Campbell
v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
299. The Court did not consider whether the Florida courts would reverse a conviction
for denial of a preliminary hearing. Some states have granted such a remedy. State v. Jua-
rez, 5 Ariz. App. 431, 427 P.2d 565 (1967); People v. Bucher, 175 Cal. App. 2d 343, 346 P.2d
202 (1959); State ex rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 35 Wis. 2d 369, 151 N.W.2d 63 (1967).
In Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973), the plaintiff pleaded guilty and was
placed on probation, restitution to his victim being a condition of probation. He complained
that the amount of the restitution had been determined in an unconstitutional manner after
his conviction. Because state law provided no procedural device to raise his objection, the
court approved injunctive relief and regarded Younger to be no obstacle.
300. 420 U.S. at 106.
301. Even for habeas corpus, the prisoner need not exhaust futile remedies. See, e.g.,
Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 564 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). It is unclear to what
extent the habeas cases on futility will influence the sort of decision made in Gerstein. If the
standard for bypassing state remedies is the same in injunction cases and in habeas cases,
then the prisoners acted too cautiously in not seeking outright release. It appears, however,
that the Court approved their caution, 420 U.S. at 107 n.6, and that therefore the two stan-
dards are different, although the difference is not clear.
If the state courts have previously rejected the argument now put forth by the federal
plaintiff, the federal court may grant equitable relief. See Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940
(9th Cir. 1974); Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973); GI Distributors v. Murphy, 336 F.
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The Court could have required the plaintiffs to exhaust their state
remedies and seek Supreme Court review of an adverse decision.302
Exhaustion of state remedies would have been required had the prison-
ers sought even a conditional release through the device of federal pre-
trial habeas corpus.30 3 Rather than hold to formal requirements,
however, the Gerstein Court took a realistic view of the claimed depri-
vation of constitutional rights. A rigorous exhaustion requirement
would merely extend the period of illegal detention. The Court found
state remedies to be of no practical significance.304
The Court has restrained the application of Gerstein. If state rem-
edies are available, the Court often will find those remedies efficacious.
For example, in O'Shea v. Litleton,30 5 the plaintiff class charged that
state judges arbitrarily set the amounts of cash bonds, sentenced blacks
more harshly than whites, and denied jury trials in misdemeanor trials.
In reversing a grant of equitable relief, the Court declared that no ac-
tual case or controversy existed, because no class representative was
awaiting trial. In dictum, the Court opined that injunctive relief would
be unavailable even to someone awaiting trial. State law provided
remedies to review the asserted deprivations of constitutional rights.
Implicitly, the Court found that the state remedies were not hopeless, as
they had been in Gerstein.
306
The Court more consciously appraised state remedies in Kugler v.
Helfant,307 in which it also denied equitable relief. Defendant Helfant
sought an injunction, alleging that he could not obtain a fair trial when
his defense promised to charge members of the New Jersey Supreme
Court with improper conduct in securing his testimony before a grand
jury. The Third Circuit found federal relief appropriate because of the
special circumstances of the case. 308 The Supreme Court agreed that if
"'extraordinary circumstances' render the state court incapable of
Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Karp v. Collins, 333 F. Supp. 15 (D.N.J. 1971) (three-
judge court). If the state court might be expected to change its mind, perhaps the plaintiff
must resort to state court. See Glenn v. Askew, 513 F.2d- 61 (5th Cir. 1975).
302. This analysis was used by the Court in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). See text accompanying note 143 supra.
303. See text accompanying notes 292-93 supra.
304. The Court thus ignored its decision in Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
305. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). See J.P. v. De Santi, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981). But see
Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1980).
306. See 414 U.S. at 502; accord, Bonner v. Circuit Court, 526 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1975);
King v. Jones, 450 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1971).
307. 421 U.S. 117 (1975).
308. Younger had left open the possibility that the federal courts have an undefined
power to enjoin in special circumstances. 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
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fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it,"3 °9 federal re-
lief would be appropriate. The Court concluded, however, that the ob-
jectivity of the entire New Jersey court system had not been
"irretrievably impaired, ' 310 and denied relief. The Court's conclusion
rested on the plaintiff's statutory right to challenge for cause any trial
judge prejudiced against him. Moreover, he had the prospect of an
impartial appellate court. Most of the state supreme court judges in-
volved had left the bench; under New Jersey law, those remaining
would be obliged to recuse themselves if Helfant's case came before
them on appeal. The Court did not rule that Helfant would in fact
receive a fair, unbiased state trial, but implied that federal relief will be
denied whenever a state provides a reasonably effective mechanism to
blunt bias.
31'
The delicate judgments required by Gerstein and Kugler are illus-
trated in New Jersey v. Chesimard,312 a Third Circuit decision.
Chesimard was being tried in state court for murder and related of-
fenses. An orthodox Muslim, she requested that her trial not take place
on Fridays, her religion's Sabbath. When the trial judge and the Ap-
pellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court refused her request,
Chesimard sought federal injunctive relief. The Third Circuit denied
relief because she had not fully employed her state appellate reme-
dies.313 The state proceedings did not deny her constitutional rights
because, in the Third Circuit's estimation, the state supreme court
would have given her a reasonably quick decision and would have had
an open mind on her freedom of religion claim.
3 14
Chesimard raises a difficult question. If someone in Chesimard's
position is denied relief by the state supreme court, perhaps only the
United States Supreme Court may review that disposition. Collateral
309. 421 U.S. at 124.
310. Id at 127.
311. See id at 130-31. By contrast, in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), the
Court found a disqualifying conflict of interest among the members of an administrative
board; provision for an appeal of the board's decisi6n was not thought sufficient to avoid a
constitutional defect in the board's composition. An adverse board decision would create
irreparable injury, which not even an appeal could remedy. Perhaps, if the board's proce-
dures had allowed a pre-hearing challenge for cause, the Court would have reached a con-
trary result.
312. 555 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
313. The Third Circuit stressed that it was denying relief because Chesimard had not
exhausted her remedies. The court refused to say whether there would be a constitutional
right to interlocutory review had New Jersey provided no remedies. 555 F.2d at 67.
314. The Third Circuit noted a previous decision of the New Jersey court upholding the
religious claims of Black Muslims, Holden v. Board of Education, 46 N.J. 281, 216 A.2d 387
(1966).
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review in the district court, formally presented as a suit for injunctive
relief, might be denied.3 15 On the other hand, collateral relief in the
form of federal habeas corpus would be available even after an exhaus-
tion of remedies.316 Habeas corpus, however, would not give the relief
sought in Chesimard or in Gerstein because the plaintiffs were not seek-
ing releases from custody. There is no reason to bar injunctive relief
for one in Chesimard's position when a prisoner in a Gerstein case need
not even exhaust state remedies. If dim prospects of state relief permit
federal intervention, as in Gerstein,31 7 the actual denial of state relief
should make federal relief equally available.
318
Bad Faith Theory
The Fifth Circuit has granted even broader relief against pending
prosecutions, employing the "bad faith" theory approved but insuffi-
ciently defined in Younger.319 In Wilson v. Thompson,320 the plaintiffs
had been arrested for scuffling with sheriff's deputies, but the charges
were eventually dismissed.32' When the plaintiffs filed civil actions
against the deputies, the criminal charges were reinstituted. The Fifth
Circuit approved injunctive relief in principle if the plaintiffs were able
to prove that the criminal charges were brought to retaliate against
them for bringing the civil suit and to deter them from seeking judicial
redress. 322 The court summarily rejected the proposition that only mul-
tiple prosecutions could evidence sufficient "bad faith" to avoid
Younger. The Fifth Circuit held that a retaliatory prosecution violates
constitutional rights. To defend such a prosecution through the normal
315. The Third Circuit also refused to decide this question. 555 F.2d at 67. Collateral
review was so denied in Lektro- Vend, 433 U.S. 623 (1977). See text accompanying note 157
supra.
316. See note 293 supra.
317. See text accompanying notes 300-01 supra.
318. See text accompanying notes 355-62 infra. See also Theis, Res Judicata in Civil
RightsAct Cases.- An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 859 (1976). It is un-
clear how the Court's recent decision in Allen v. McCurry, 499 U.S. 90 (1981), would dis-
pose of Ms. Chesimard's case.
319. See 401 U.S. at 48-49; Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.. 1103, 1115-16, 1116 n.36
(1977).
320. 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979).
321. On remand, relief was denied for a failure of proof. 638 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1981).
See also Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1981); Munson v. Gilliam, 543 F.2d 48
(8th Cir. 1976); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975); Canal Theaters Inc. v.
Murphy, 473 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1973); Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971); Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971), affid, 467 F.2d 113
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
322. Whether the Constitution forbids re-institution of criminal charges to retaliate for a
civil suit is a debatable issue. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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course of trial and appeal prolongs the violation of constitutional
rights. As the criminal proceeding did not provide an adequate rem-
edy, a federal injunction might issue.
323
Wilson v. Thompson has made explicit what Gerstein and Heifant
have suggested: sometimes judicial proceedings in themselves may
deny constitutional rights. In the ordinary case, an individual may
complain about the constitutionality of a penal statute, and the normal
course of trial and appeal preserves his or her constitutional rights.
When, however, the process denies constitutional rights, injunctive re-
lief may be necessary to prevent irreparable loss. In cases such as Wil-
son, courts have made no inquiry into the availability of state
injunctive relief,324 and should examine whether state remedies might
prevent irreparable injury.
Wilson v. Thompson went beyond Gerstein in two respects. First,
Wilson aborted the state criminal proceedings. The Court may not ap-
prove an injunction that completely halts criminal proceedings. 325 In
applying Gerstein, a number of lower courts have stressed that the Ger-
stein plaintiffs were not trying to avoid a state trial.326 Second, the
Fifth Circuit has attempted the resolution of difficult factual questions
concerning motivation. Traditionally, equity has avoided such a
task.327 In Gerstein, the federal injunction merely mandated that prob-
able cause hearings be conducted by the state courts; the federal court
did not decide probable cause for each prisoner.
Injunctions against Threatened Criminal Actions
When no criminal proceedings are pending, the Court has, for the
most part, maintained the traditional commitment to equitable inter-
vention. Younger broadly implied that this type of relief might no
longer be forthcoming. 328 The Supreme Court dispelled these implica-
323. Accord, City of Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966); S.S. Kresge Co.
v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 178 S.E.2d 382 (1971).
324. The cases cited in note 322 supra, indicate that state relief might be available in
such a situation.
325. Habeas corpus would seem to be the more appropriate remedy, and habeas re-
quires the exhaustion of state remedies. See text accompanying notes 292-93 supra.
326. E.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Conover v.
Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973).
327. See text accompanying note 205 supra. But see note 322 supra.
328. See the quotation in text accompanying note 278 supra. The Fifth Circuit complied
with this implication. Other circuits disagreed and granted relief, so long as no prosecution
was pending. E.g., Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Kugler, 446
F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971).
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tions in reviewing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Steffel v. Thompson:
329
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal
complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative
legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system;
nor can federal intervention . . . be interpreted as reflecting nega-
tively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional princi-
ples. . . . A [federal] refusal . . . to intervene when no state
proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the
Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forego-
ing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity....330
In upholding a grant of declaratory relief, Steffel reasoned that such
relief was "less intrusive" 331 than an injunction, suggesting that an in-
junction might be impermissible in some instances in which a declara-
tion would be permissible.3 32 Because the plaintiff in Steffel was
seeking only a declaration, the Court's remarks are dictum. Later
cases, particularly Wooley v. Maynard,333 have established that a plain-
tiff may obtain an injunction if there is a threat of repeated prosecu-
tion.334 The Court often grants pre-enforcement relief without even
mentioning the Younger doctrine.
335
The Court has had difficulty in setting limits upon intervention in
threatened criminal proceedings. Its inattention to traditional equity
practice has led to one radical intrusion. In Allee v. Medrano,336 the
plaintiffs, organizers of a strike by farm workers, obtained injunctive
relief against state police officials. The lower court had found that the
state officials had "taken sides" 337 in a labor-management controversy
and had used their authority to suppress the plaintiffs' efforts to organ-
329. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
330. Id at 462.
331. Id at 469.
332. Cases interpreting the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act have rejected this view.
See note 212 & accompanying text supra. If, however, one accepts that Douglas v. Jean-
nette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), drcussed in text accompanying notes 253-56 supra, normally
forbids federal equitable intervention, the declaratory judgment offers a difference in form
of remedy to rationalize federal relief. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
Had the Court in S1effel been concerned about preserving the autonomy of state gov-
ernment, it would have inquired into available state remedies. Most states would grant the
declaratory or injunctive relief that federal courts are willing to supply. See notes 184-91 &
accompanying text supra.
333. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
334. See id at 712 (court distinguished between first-time threatened prosecution and
the threat of repeated prosecutions in the future, several successive prosecutions having al-
ready been undertaken against the same defendants).
335. Eg., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 445 U.S. 972
(1980).
336. 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
337. Id at 808.
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ize a strike. The lower court invalidated a number of statutes that had
formed the bases for some of the arrests. The court further enjoined
arrests for violations of a valid statute unless the defendants should
have adequate cause to make an arrest for a violation. The Supreme
Court upheld the grant of injunctive relief.
338
Unjustified arrests for alleged violations of valid statutes can dis-
courage the plaintiffs' first amendment rights. Although the arrests
may violate first amendment rights as well as fourth amendment rights,
the propriety of a remedy is a different and more difficult question.
When there is no attack on the statute itself, equity has traditionally
avoided an injunction directing police officials to arrest on probable
cause.339 Allee may be another example of equity's flexibility: if the
inequity is clear, relief will issue notwithstanding institutional
restraints.
In Rizzo v. Goode,340 the Court proceeded in a different direction.
The plaintiffs had established to the satisfaction of the lower courts a
pattern of police misbehavior-illegal arrests, searches, and seizures, as
well as police brutality. They challenged no substantive penal law
upon which the arrests, searches, and seizures had been based. The
lower courts had ordered the writing of departmental guidelines to
lower the incidence of such conduct. In effect, these guidelines would
have formed a comprehensive, detailed injunction requiring the police
not to violate constitutional rights. The Court reversed, noting that the
alleged pattern had not been sufficiently established. 341 The Court de-
clared, however, that the federal courts should not inject themselves
338. Allee seems to conflict with dictum in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974),
decided only shortly before Allee. The Court in O'Shea disapproved an injunction that
would have required the setting of reasonable amounts for cash bonds, uninfluenced by the
alleged racial prejudice of the defendant judges. The Court stressed the difficulties in en-
forcing compliance. Every state defendant dissatisfied with a judge's bond decision would
be able to institute federal contempt proceedings, including appeals. Id at 502.
339. Instead, a suit for damages has been considered the only appropriate civil judicial
remedy for breach of the probable cause standard. Even the Fifth Circuit's decision in Wil-
son v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979), did not go so far, but only enjoined a single
prosecution. Difficult factual issues would be litigated in Wilson, but would be litigated only
once; in a situation such as that in Allee, factual issues will arise numerous times. Arrests for
violations of valid laws that the arrestees have not violated can dampen efforts to enforce
civil rights. The federal courts, like their state counterparts, have generally denied injunc-
tive relief because these suits carry too high a risk of duplication and delay.
340. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Accord, Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 931 (1977).
341. The Court might also have fallen back on equity's refusal to enjoin illegal arrests, a
position that would repudiate Allee.
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"into the internal disciplinary affairs" 342 of the police department.
Rizzo thus implied broadly that the lower courts should have disquali-
fied themselves because federal courts should not interfere with local
police authorities. Rizzo's broad language, especially in the absence of
either pending or threatened state charges, has created the erroneous
impression that Younger counsels deference not only to state courts but
also to state legislative policies.
Injunctions in "Hybrid" Cases
In its handling of the hybrid cases, the Court has significantly
strayed from its prior decisions. In Roe v. Wade,343 the Court gave
brief consideration to the intervention petition of a medical doctor who
had been charged with abortion offenses, but who sought relief as a
"potential" future defendant. The Court found no merit in this distinc-
tion 344 and was unwilling to concede that a pending prosecution sty-
mies contemplated conduct whose validity has not been adjudicated.
As the Court considered the merits of the constitutional arguments
pressed by other parties, its ruling on intervention had little practical
effect.
The Court considered another hybrid situation in Hicks v. Mi-
randa.345 The plaintiff was the owner of a movie theatre that exhibited
an allegedly obscene movie. The police, armed with warrants, seized
copies of the film. Two days later, the plaintiff's employees were
charged with obscenity. On that same day, the plaintiff received notice
of a hearing to be held the next day to decide whether the seized movie
should be declared obscene. The plaintiff presented objections to the
hearing and refused to participate. The next day, a state judge declared
the movie obscene and ordered a seizure of all copies found on the
plaintiff's premises. Rather than appeal, the plaintiff instituted a fed-
eral civil rights action for injunctive and declaratory relief. State crimi-
nal charges were then filed against the plaintiff.
The Court ruled that Younger barred federal relief. First, the state
court had already given the plaintiff a hearing on his film, even though
the plaintiff had chosen not to participate. The Court correctly relied
on the hearing already provided. The plaintiff had a full opportunity
to participate in a hearing that gave him a prompt determination of the
342. 423 U.S. at 380.
343. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
344. The Court evidently forgot its decision in Cline v. Frink Dairy, 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
See text accompanying notes 248-52 supra.
345. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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legal issues. 346 He had elected not to participate in the hearing and was
unhappy with the court's decision, but the state court proceedings re-
lieved him of his dilemma, for he had a judicial determination of his
legal rights.
Second, the Court suggested that the plaintiffs employees were to
receive a hearing in the form of a criminal trial, and that because their
interests were "intertwined" 347 with his, their trial would vindicate his
rights. This suggestion is incorrect. Both the employer and the em-
ployee may need a rapid determination of the legal issues, so that both
may avoid the dilemma of either breaking the law with each showing
of the movie or surrendering their constitutional rights. In Hicks, they
had already had such a hearing.
Third, the Court suggested that, even if the interests of the em-
ployer and the employees were not intertwined, relief would be denied
the employer. The Court observed that no Younger case had ever re-
quired that the state proceedings already be pending on the date fed-
eral suit is filed. The Court declared that a state charge may preempt a
prior-filed federal action as long as no "proceedings of substance on the
merits" 348 have taken place in the federal action. A contrary rule
would "trivialize" 349 the principles of Younger. The Court thus casu-
ally obliterated an important component of Exparte Young, which had
emphasized the priority of the federal action as the basis for its
precedence. 350
The short-sightedness of the Court's opinion in Hicks is demon-
strated in a companion case, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 351 The three
plaintiffs operated three taverns that featured "topless" dancing. When
the county enacted an ordinance to forbid this form of entertainment,
the three sought relief for a violation of the right of freedom of speech.
346. It could also be argued that the obscenity of a particular movie should not be adju-
dicated in equitable proceedings.
347. 422 U.S. at 348-49. But see Women's Services, P.C. v. Douglas, 653 F.2d 355 (8th
Cir. 1981).
348. Id at 349. The Court did not expand on a definition of this standard. In Hicks, the
district court had denied a temporary restraining order. If the lower court had granted a
temporary restraining order, conduct in reliance on that order should not have barred the
federal plaintiff from further relief, if he had been subsequently arrested. Nonetheless, the
amount of work done by the lower court would seem to be the same.
In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), discussed in text accompanying notes
350-51 infra, the lower court granted a preliminary injunction; the Court implied that con-
duct might resume after the grant of a preliminary injunction. It is unclear what result
would obtain if the preliminary injunction had been denied.
349. 422 U.S. at 350.
350. See text accompanying note 233 supra.
351. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
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After suit was filed in federal court and a temporary restraining order
denied, the prohibited conduct resumed in one of the bars, whose own-
er and his employees received criminal summonses. One month later,
the federal district court granted preliminary injunctive relief to all
three owners. On review, the Court approved a preliminary injunction
in favor of the two owners who had complied with the ordinance until
the district court had ruled. The Court ruled that the third owner
should not have received a hearing on the merits because the federal
suit was "in an embryonic stage"3 52 when he received a state criminal
summons. Thus, one may receive a federal resolution of the dilemma
created by an allegedly unconstitutional law, but only by choosing to
be impaled on one horn of the dilemma until the federal court has en-
gaged in sufficient "proceedings of substance on the merits.
3 5 3
The Fifth Circuit has carried non-intervention well beyond the
limits of Hicks-Doran. In Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance,3 54 the
plaintiffs filed a federal suit against newly-enacted Texas obscenity
statutes. The district court heard the merits and sustained the constitu-
tionality of the statutes; the plaintiffs appealed. While their appeal was
pending, other persons were charged with violations of the statutes. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the mer-
its in major part, but expressed doubts about the constitutionality of
some provisions in the statute. The Fifth Circuit stated, however, that
there should be abstention with regard to these constitutionally doubt-
ful provisions, in part relying on the uncertain meaning of the statutes
as a matter of state law. The district court had done substantial work
on the merits before the state proceedings had been brought. More-
over, the plaintiffs in the federal suit were not related to the state crimi-
nal defendants. Nonetheless, the court stated that "Our Federalism"
demanded that the state courts have the first opportunity to construe
state law.3
55
Hybrid cases, in which the defendant has been convicted and
wishes to repeat his or her conduct, have evoked a curious response
from the Court. One would expect that the defendant would be denied
equitable relief. The Court that decided Hicks and Doran to discour-
age races to the courthouse has departed from prior practice by being
352. Id at 929.
353. One hopes the Court will not apply Hicks-Doran in the context of political speech.
Under Hicks-Doran, the speaker would be obliged to postpone his or her speech in order to
obtain the federal district court's ruling on the merits.
354. 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981).
355. Id at 1035.
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more generous to suitors who have already been convicted. In Ellis v.
Dyson ,356 the plaintiffs were arrested for violating an anti-loitering law.
They sought a writ of prohibition from the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, which was denied on the ground that they should have raised
their objection in the trial court. They then presented their constitu-
tional arguments in the municipal court, which denied them on the
merits. The plaintiffs entered a plea of nolo contendere, under which
they would have the right to appeal and seek de novo trial in the
county court. At this point, they abandoned the Texas court system
and filed a federal civil rights action. The Court approved the availa-
bility of declaratory relief against the statute, although it did not re-
solve whether the pleas of nolo contendere would have res judicata
effect on the constitutional issues.357 In this regard, the Court's disposi-
tion paralleled the dissenter opinion in Lektro-Vend. Both opinions
would allow a party to withdraw federal law issues from state court
proceedings and to present them to a federal court at a later time.
Even if pleas of the parties in Ellis were not res judicata, 358 the
Roe-Hicks-Doran doctrine arguably bars declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. The plaintiffs had a full opportunity to challenge the state law in
the state proceedings; their refusal to take that opportunity should not
aid their federal case. If it would "trivialize" Younger to race to federal
court before state charges are filed, it would also trivialize Younger to
eliminate the state charges through a hasty guilty plea. The Court has
thus created a loophole to the doctrine set forth in Hicks and Doran.
Wooley v. Maynard359 followed the rule of Ellis v. Dyson. The
plaintiffs, husband and wife who were Jehovah's Witnesses, objected to
the motto, "Live Free or Die," stamped on their New Hampshire li-
cense plates. They thus covered the motto, a violation of state law for
which the husband received three traffic citations. At each trial for the
offense, he explained his religious objections to the motto, but was con-
victed. He and his wife then sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
Once again, the Court regarded the suit as one for relief against a
threatened prosecution when none was pending.360 "[Tihe suit is in no
356. 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
357. Ellis fits within the rule of Steffel v. Thompson because the plaintiffs alleged a
threatened prosecution, but no prosecution was pending to resolve their constitutional objec-
tion. See notes 330-32 & accompanying text supra.
358. See 421 U.S. at 440-43 (Powell, J., dissenting).
359. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
360. The Court distinguished Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), which had




way 'designed to annul the results of a state trial' since the relief sought
is wholly prospective." 361 The relief was retrospective, however, be-
cause it would reopen issues already litigated. The plaintiff had unsuc-
cessfully litigated his constitutional argument in state court and, having
no prosecution pending against him, had recourse to the federal district
court. The Wooley Court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor on the merits,
thereby denying collateral estoppel effect to the state court judgment.
362
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Allen v. McCurry363 does
little to clarify Ellis and Wooley. In a pretrial motion, McCurry unsuc-
cessfully argued that the court should suppress evidence in his state
criminal trial. He later brought a section 1983 claim364 for damages in
federal court. The Supreme Court ruled that the federal courts must
give preclusive effect to the state court judgment because McCurry had
received a full and fair hearing in the state court on his constitutional
rights. The Court noted, however, that it did not rule on whether an
unused opportunity to raise an issue would bar further litigation by the
same party.
365
The question of the issue preclusion effect of an unused opportu-
nity to raise an issue was also left unresolved in Ellis. Moreover, it is
difficult to discern whether Wooley has been overturned. The husband
in Wooley had unsuccessfully litigated his constitutional argument
many times and, under Allen, should have been barred from further
duplicative attempts. The Allen Court did not refer to Wooley, how-
ever, leaving the matter in some uncertainty. In both Ellis and Wooley,
avoidance of duplicative litigation and maintenance of proper respect
for the state judiciary are arguments against relitigation in state court.
The effect ofAllen on a case such as Doran is also unclear. Later-
ified criminal charges may bar injunctive relief until the state proceed-
ings are concluded. Dictum in Allen, however, suggests that, because
the federal plaintiff in Doran filed suit before the institution of the state
charges, he would be able to relitigate his constitutional arguments in
the federal district court.
366
To resolve these problems, the Court must recognize that a pend-
ing prosecution does not necessarily eliminate the dilemma of one who
361. 430 U.S. at 711.
362. Perhaps the Court was influenced by the fact that the state proceedings had taken
place in municipal court. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1, Comment d,
Illustration 7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
363. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
364. 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
365. 449 U.S. at 94 n.5.
366. Id at 101 n.17.
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desires to continue arguably protected conduct. Diligence in seeking
relief, the "race to the courthouse," manifests the defendant's desire for
the speedy relief that equity promises. In contrast, the party who has
had questions answered or could have had them answered has a less
compelling argument for injunctive relief. He or she no longer faces
the dilemma that results from uncertainty.
If the Court desires to discourage the race to the courthouse, it can
still protect the citizen by staying the prior-filed federal suit and await-
ing speedy, definitive relief by the state courts. If the promise of speedy
state relief is not fulfilled, the federal court should proceed to relieve
the citizen of his or her uncertainty. That state charges are filed imme-
diately after the federal suit does not assure the citizen of speedy relief;
those quickly filed state charges may languish on the docket and stifle
protected conduct.
Younger's Extension to State Civil Litigation
The application of Younger to state civil proceedings is uncertain.
In many cases, the federal plaintiff has attempted to enjoin pending
state civil proceedings. Fewer cases have considered injunctions
against threats of civil proceedings. Even less attention has been given
to the coordination of duplicative civil rights suits that seek only mone-
tary relief.
Injunctions against Pending State Civil Proceedings
To what extent the Younger doctrine has application in civil litiga-
tion remains uncertain. The Court's analysis has proceeded on the as-
sumption that, because Younger involved criminal proceedings, its
application to civil proceedings should depend on the particular civil
proceeding's resemblance or relation to criminal proceedings. Instead
of relying on this assumption, the Court should be asking whether fed-
eral injunctive relief would be duplicative and, if so, whether duplica-
tion is necessary to protect constitutional rights.
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd ,367 the Court's first post-Younger deci-
sion in this area, the local prosecutor had obtained a state court decla-
ration that a movie theater was a nuisance because it had exhibited an
obscene movie. Under local law, the theater would remain closed until
the owner had posted a bond against re-establishment of the nuisance.
The local statute could have been reasonably interpreted to mean that
the bond would be given to ensure that no obscene movies would be
367. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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shown again in the future.368 Evidently working under the broader
definition of "nuisance," the owner asked for federal injunctive relief
rather than appealing the state court order. The Court justified a de-
nial of equitable relief on the ground that the state nuisance proceed-
ings were "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.
'369
Accordingly, Younger would bar federal relief. The Court emphasized
that the state appellate process, supervised by the United States
Supreme Court, has been charged with the correction of errors in the
interpretation of constitutional law.
370
Huffman is a confusing application of Younger because it does not
carefully consider the nature of the plaintiff's constitutional claim. The
nuisance statute in Huffman371 probably did not transgress the Consti-
tution if it barred exhibition of movies already declared obscene in ad-
versary proceedings.372 If, however, the state statute clearly had
required a bond against the exhibition of all obscene movies or had
provided for closure for a set period of time, the owner would suffer
prior restraint, which state appellate proceedings would merely
lengthen. When the Court in Mitchem v. Foster373 declared the Civil
Rights Act to be an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, it was
considering a state injunction that completely closed a bookstore be-
cause particular books, not necessarily all books in the store, were ob-
scene. Mitchum would be a sterile decision if it held out the prospect of
an injunction, but then required full exhaustion of state appellate reme-
dies to prevent this blanket prior restraint.
374
The ability to enjoin unconstitutional nuisance proceedings with-
out exhausting state remedies was confirmed in Vance v. Universal
368. Only later was the state supreme court to rule in another case that the owner need
refrain from exhibition of a particular movie previously declared obscene. Id at 612 & n.23.
369. Id at 604.
370. Without acknowledging it, the Court was espousing the philosophy of Atlantic
Coast. 398 U.S. 281 (1970). See text accompanying notes 143-49 supra.
371. While Huffman was pending in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Ohio
had narrowly construed the Ohio nuisance statute in State v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled
"Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974), with a view to avoiding the
constitutional difficulties that had concerned the Huffman trial court. 420 U.S. at 612 n.23.
372. The Court had denied relief in a previous case, upon considering an interim deci-
sion of the state court. Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974) (interim state court decision
struck down a statute as an unconstitutional prior restraint when construed as in the case
pending before the Court; remanded to the District Court for reconsideration in light of the
interim state court proceeding to determine if full relief in state court could be obtained by
motion to dismiss).
373. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
374. In Sendak v. Nihiser, 423 U.S. 976 (1975), the Court remanded for reconsideration
in light of Huffman.
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Amusement Co. 37- In Vance, a movie exhibitor received advance word
that the district attorney was planning to enjoin the further exhibition
of obscene movies. The exhibitor sought injunctive and declaratory re-
lief before the state proceedings could begin. The lower courts granted
a declaration that the state injunctive proceedings would work a prior
restraint on the exhibitor. Once the state court issued an injunction, the
prosecutor could obtain ex parte temporary restraining orders against
the screening of additional movies. The federal plaintiff could be held
in contempt for violation of such orders even if the movies in question
were ultimately found not to be obscene.
The Court approved this ruling on the merits, giving no considera-
tion to Huffman. When the plaintiff filed, the state proceedings were
not in progress, as in Huffman, and the prosecutor did not subsequently
initiate proceedings. The Court's analysis of the merits indicates that it
found the injunction remedy fatally defective as a prior restraint. Ap-
peal of individual prior restraints would merely prolong and exacerbate
the undesirable effects of a prior restraint machinery.
Trainor v. Hernandez376 further illustrates the confusion about the
"extension" of Younger to civil cases. State authorities, believing that
Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez had committed fraud in their receipt of public
welfare benefits, instituted a suit for the return of the disputed pay-
ments. The state officials also attached the Hernandezes' bank account,
a procedure that, under Illinois law, could be accomplished without
judicial approval. The citizens then obtained a federal court injunction
against the attachment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
The Court maintained that Younger principles should apply because
"[b]oth the suit and the accompanying writ of attachment were brought
to vindicate important state policies . . . . 377 That these policies
could have been advanced through criminal charges also seemed to
convince the Court that Younger should apply.3 7 8 At the end of its
opinion, however, the Court suggested that if Illinois law offered no
means of interlocutory challenge to the attachment procedure,379 a fed-
eral injunction would be proper. Thus, relief was denied on the
375. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
376. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
377. Id. at 444.
378. Id at 446-47; accord, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977); Doe v. Maher, 414
F. Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded, 432 U.S. 526
(1977); see Lecates v. Justice of the Peace Court, 637 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1980).
379. 431 U.S. at 447. Although not cited by the Court, its earlier decision in Lynch v.




grounds that the state had important interests to advance in the state
proceedings. Nonetheless, if those proceedings would deny constitu-
tional rights, federal injunctive relief would issue.
380
In Trainor, the Court introduced a distinction that could weigh
heavily on the victim of an allegedly illegal attachment. The debtor
maintains that the initial seizure has denied and continues to deny
property rights. If the defendant has had no procedural opportunity to
raise this argument in the state courts, immediate federal relief is ap-
propriate. If, however, state procedure allows one to raise the argu-
ment, the defendant must dutifully proceed through the state court
system, possibly enduring further deprivation of his or her rights. Al-
though federal courts do not promise to act more quickly than state
courts, when the state courts have routinely processed attachment writs
over a number of years, the state trial court may offer no redress, and
only by appeal can a defendant obtain critical evaluation of routine
and familiar practices. Rather than focusing on the real availability of
relief, as in Gerstein,381 the Court focused here on the theoretical avail-
ability of a remedy.
In Moore v. Sims, 382 the Court expanded its non-intervention doc-
trine, but continued to premise it upon a finding that the state civil
proceedings should be in aid of criminal law enforcement. The Court
also failed to clarify the extent to which state remedies must be avail-
able. The plaintiffs were suspected of abusing their children, who were
summarily taken from the parents' custody. The state then filed suit to
appoint a conservator for the children. The parents' federal suit raised
the following constitutional objections in three areas: first, state au-
thorities' temporary custody; second, the procedures for appointing a
permanent conservator; and third, the placement of their names in a
national computer network of abusive parents. 383
The district court returned interim custody to the parents. The
parents did not pursue a state interlocutory appeal of the interim cus-
tody decision. Their state writ of habeas corpus was denied because of
improper venue, leaving them free to refile. Instead of disapproving
the return to custody when state remedies had not been fully pursued,
380. On remand, the district court concluded that Illinois lacked an adequate procedure
to challenge the validity of the attachment, and the district court accordingly entered a judg-
ment, sub noa Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. IU. 1978), which the Supreme
Court affirmed, sub nom Quer v. Hernandez, 440 U.S. 951 (1979).
381. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). For a discussion of Gerstein, see text accom-
panying notes 296-303 supra.
382. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
383. 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1189-94 (1976).
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the Court seemed to reason that, having obtained this relief, the parents
were obliged to present all other constitutional attacks in state court.
384
The second group of constitutional objections could be asserted in
defense of the conservatorship proceedings and therefore the Court had
a predictable and sound reason for denying federal relief. There was
no plausible argument that state court resolution would itself deny con-
stitutional rights. Nonetheless, the Court buttressed its conclusion with
the unnecessary argument that the child abuse proceedings were in aid
of the enforcement of criminal statutes.38
5
The Court's treatment of the third issue suggests a broad range of
nonintervention that may be inherent in state civil proceedings. The
civil nature of the proceedings in Moore frustrated the parents' efforts
to enjoin the state from placing their names in a national computer
network of child abusers. The alleged unconstitutionality of this prac-
tice did not affect the fairness of the proceedings to appoint a conserva-
tor. In addition, a successful attack on the practice would not defeat
the state's efforts to intervene in the parent-child relationship.
Under Texas procedure, however, the state court had authority to
entertain a wide range of counterclaims, including the parents' attack
on the computer system. The Court disapproved federal consideration
of this claim because the state court could consider it as a counterclaim.
In a state that permits a liberal counterclaim practice, this analysis
would draw into state court a wide variety of constitutional issues once
the state has brought an enforcement action. Moore thus coordinates
overlapping proceedings more than it forbids injunction of state court
proceedings because the plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin executive offi-
cials from extra-judicially labeling them child abusers.
From the standpoint of coordinating duplicative litigation, this as-
pect of Moore has support in policy and precedent. The Court's later
decision in Allen v. McCurry, however, may lessen the effect of Moore's
effort to avoid duplication. Under Allen, the parents, although re-
quired under federal law to file a state counterclaim, would be able to
"reserve" their constitutional arguments. Thus, the parents would be
obliged to litigate first in the state court system, but would have the
freedom to return to federal court and avoid the preclusive effect of a
state court judgment on the counterclaim.
386
The Court has introduced additional confusion by seeming to ap-
prove an injunction against state proceedings even when the proceed-
384. 442 U.S. at 431-32.
385. Id at 423.
386. See 449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1981).
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ings do not deny constitutional rights. In Town ofLockport v. Citizens
for Community Action,387 citizens sought a federal injunction to put
into effect a disputed county charter. County officials brought a later
suit in state court to prevent the charter from going into effect. The
federal district court enjoined prosecution of the state suit. In a foot-
note, the Court declared that Younger did not require district court def-
erence to the state suit.388 As the federal suit was filed first, the federal
judge did- not have to abandon jurisdiction.
The Court's decisions have led the lower courts to focus on
whether state civil proceedings are sufficiently similar to criminal pro-
ceedings, when the relevant question is whether the state civil proceed-
ings deny constitutional rights. In Henry v. First National Bank,38 9 a
recent Fifth Circuit decision, blacks had organized boycotts and picket-
ing of white-owned businesses in protest of racial discrimination. The
white merchants sued in a Mississippi state court for violation of the
state's antitrust law390 and recovered a $1.25 million judgment and an
injunction against the protestors' activities. In Mississippi, an injunc-
tion is effective immediately upon entry and a judgment for damages
becomes executory upon entry unless the appellant posts bond for 125%
of the judgment. Because a bond in this amount was so onerous that it
would have bankrupted some of the defendants, the state court defend-
ants sought a stay order from the trial court and from the Mississippi
Supreme Court, both of which denied relief. The defendants then filed
a federal suit, in which they sought relief from the bond requirement
while they pressed their appeal of the state judgment. They argued that
executing the injunction and the damages award pending appeal vio-
lated constitutional rights. The Fifth Circuit upheld a grant of relief
that stayed execution of the state judgment even though no bond had
been posted. The court observed that Younger was not generally appli-
cable to all civil litigation and that the Supreme Court had limited
Younger to cases in which important state interests were at stake.
Moreover, the Supreme Court had not applied Younger to a case in-
volving only private parties. According to the Fifth Circuit, the State
of Mississippi had the limited interest in the case of providing a forum
for the resolution of private disputes. The federal order did not inter-
387. 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
388. Id at 264 n.8.
389. 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979).
390. The Fifth Circuit had earlier ruled that the filing of such a suit by private parties
did not violate constitutional rights. Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.
1971). Proposed enforcement of the judgment sufficiently implicated the state to satisfy the
state action requirement.
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fere because the state courts were free to process the case on the mer-
its.39' The federal injunction merely stayed execution of the trial
court's judgment. The court failed to discern the true basis of interven-
tion, even though it came to the right result.
In a later case, the Fifth Circuit came to an opposite but equally
correct result, once again failing to perceive the correct justification for
its result, because it engaged in the line of analysis introduced in
Huffman. In Gresham Park Community Organization v. Howell,392 var-
ious individuals picketed and boycotted a liquor store that opened for
business in their neighborhood. The owner of the liquor store obtained
a temporary restraining order from the state court to prohibit further
interference with his business. The protestors were heard in state court
on their motion to dissolve the order and entered an appeal to the
state's intermediate appellate court, which dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. Rather than appeal to the state's supreme court, which clearly
had jurisdiction, the protestors sought federal injunctive relief against
the temporary restraining order.
Recognizing that only private parties were involved in the state
litigation, the court declared that the liquor store owner's request for a
temporary restraining order was in aid of a state criminal law that pro-
hibited picketing and boycotts. As the private party was attempting to
prevent a crime under state law, the federal court should not have en-
joined the temporary restraining order. The Fifth Circuit should have
concentrated, instead, on whether the state procedures denied the fed-
eral plaintiffs their constitutional rights. Unlike the citizens in Henry,
the citizens in Gresham Park were trying to avoid the state proceedings.
They did not assert that an appeal through the state system would deny
them their constitutional rights. Moreover, they did not attempt to use
their state appellate remedies.
The Third Circuit also has had difficulties in applying Younger to
pending civil matters between private parties. In Johnson v. Kely, 393
the plaintiffs were record owners of real estate that had been sold for
delinquent taxes to purchasers who then brought quiet-title actions in
state court. The record owners, contending that the procedure for sell-
ing their property was constitutionally defective, requested federal in-
junctive relief against the state court actions. The Third Circuit
granted relief because the state was not a party to the quiet-title action
391. 595 F.2d at 301.
392. 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981).




and because the state had no important interests at stake. The court
could have found that the state had an important interest in maintain-
ing tax sales, and it should have found that the quiet-title actions did
not deny constitutional rights. The record owners had full opportunity
to present their constitutional arguments in the state proceedings. The
Third Circuit promoted duplicative proceedings because it could find
no state interest akin to that behind the enforcement of the criminal
law.
The Seventh Circuit took the correct approach in Cousins v.
Wigoda.394 In 1972, those elected as Illinois delegates to the Demo-
cratic National Convention were challenged by a group who claimed
that the elected delegates did not satisfy party qualifications. The
elected delegates filed in state court to restrain the challengers, who
then sued in federal court, alleging that the state suit infringed on first
amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit noted that the state proceed-
ings offered full opportunity for the challengers to present their consti-
tutional arguments. The court refused to assume that the trial and




The Court has given incomplete guidance on whether a federal
court should enjoin pending state administrative hearings and on
whether the citizen may resort to federal court for injunctive relief after
administrative hearings have concluded. In the early case of Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co. ,396 the railroads asked for a federal injunction
invalidating maximum rates established by the state utility commission.
The Court denied relief because when the railroads filed suit, they
could have had review in the state supreme court, which would have
stayed the effect of the railroad commission's order.397 In dictum, the
Court stated that, once the rates had been fully approved by the state
courts, the railroads could seek federal intervention against the en-
forcement of the rates.398 The Court further assumed that once en-
forcement began, even in proceedings before the administrative agency,
a federal court could not intervene, just as it could not intervene in
394. 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California,
623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980).
395. Justice Rehnquist denied an emergency stay of the Seventh Circuit's order. 409
U.S. 1201 (1972).
396. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
397. Id at 228.




Gibson v. Berryhill,4°° a 1973 Supreme Court case, followed the
assumption in Prentis that intervention in enforcement proceedings
would be impermissible, but found an exception to justify the grant of
relief. The federal plaintiffs were optometrists employed by a corpora-
tion. The state optometry board argued that the practice of this profes-
sion in the employ of a corporation constituted unauthorized practice.
The board obtained a state injunction against the corporation and then
notified the individual optometrists of administrative hearings to disci-
pline them. The optometrists brought a federal injunctive suit, alleging
that the individual members of the board were biased because they had
a personal financial stake in the outcome of the disciplinary proceed-
ings. The Court approved injunctive relief, although any board deter-
mination would be reviewed de novo in the state court system.
Revocation of the plaintiffs' licenses would cause such bad publicity for
them and consequent damage to their professional reputation that cor-
rection of a biased decision would not give them complete relief.40 1
The Third Circuit's recent decision in Garden State Bar Association
v. Middlesex,40 2 which builds upon Gibson, opens up the potential for
even greater intervention into enforcement proceedings. One of the pe-
titioners, an attorney, maintained that certain provisions of the state's
attorney discipline rules as well as pending administrative hearings to
investigate his alleged violations of these rules infringed his first
amendment rights. The district court had abstained on the basis of
Younger, but the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that Younger ab-
stention contemplates that the petitioner have a reasonably speedy fo-
rum to give him an authoritative resolution of his constitutional
arguments. The Third Circuit found that the local ethics panel, consti-
tuted in part of non-lawyers, could not give authoritative consideration
to the petitioner's constitutional arguments. Accordingly, the court
found no sound basis in Younger for deference to a proceeding that
could not give the requested relief. As administrative agencies are not
generally accorded the authority to entertain constitutional argu-
ments, 40 3 this line of reasoning has great potential for reversing in prac-
tice the deference shown by Prentis to administrative enforcement
399. Id at 225-26. Prentis assumed that the Anti-Injunction Act would bar such relief.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), removed this premise of Prentis.
400. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
401. Id at 577 n.16; accord, Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978).
402. 643 F.2d 119 (3d Cir.), aj'd on rehearing, 651 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1981). But see
Simopoulos v. Virginia State Bd., 844 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1981).
403. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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proceedings.404
When the administrative proceedings are of an enforcement na-
ture, the citizen may be obliged to exhaust state judicial remedies after
the administrative hearing has terminated,40 5 a possibility which Pren-
tis supports.4°6 On the other hand, the Constitution does not ensure
Supreme Court review of state administrative proceedings as it ensures
Supreme Court review of state judicial proceedings.4°7 Federal court
intervention at the conclusion of administrative proceedings does not
upset the division of jurisdiction worked out by Congress in the way
that intervention in pending judicial proceedings disrupts the legisla-
tive plan. When a citizen challenges decisions made without formal
hearing, he or she may immediately resort to federal court.408 The ad-
dition of a hearing should not force a citizen into state court, unless the
provision for an administrative hearing with judicial review eliminates
a claim that enforcement denies constitutional rights.4° 9 The answer to
404. On remand, the court stressed that it was not approving an injunction; it -was disap-
proving abstention. It suggested that both proceedings proceed concurrently., 651 F.2d at
158.
405. Eg., Peterson v. Sheean, 635 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1980); Rosenthal v. Carr, 614 F.2d
1219 (9th Cir. 1980); Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 558 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1977); Doe
v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976); ACLU v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d .340 (4th Cir. 1976);
Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1975). The courts have made
the same assumptions in disciplinary proceedings for other professions and for licensed oc-
cupations. See Leigh v. McGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1979); Munson v. Janklow, 563
F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1977); Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477 (Ist Cir. 1977); Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners v. Howze, 445 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1971); see also North v. Budig, 637
F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1981).
406. 211 U.S. at 225-26. The Third Circuit's recent decision in New Jersey Education
Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1978), illustrates confusion with regard to when
rulemaking sufficiently concludes that a federal challenge is appropriate. The state of New
Jersey changed its regulations concerning qualifications of teachers, tenured as well as un-
tenured, in bilingual education programs. A plaintiff class including all affected teachers
filed a statutory appeal in the New Jersey state court. The teachers also filed in federal
district court for injunctive relief directed at the state's education commissioner. The Third
Circuit approved injunctive relief because such relief would not interfere with the enforce-
ment of the criminal law or with any equally important state interest. The Third Circuit
further stated that "the adjudication of the constitutionality of administrative regulations is
not a 'core' function of the state judiciary." Id at 768.
The Third Circuit should have denied relief for the reason set forth in Prentis: Until
approved by the state judiciary, the rule did not deprive anyone of a job. After state pro-
ceedings were complete, Prentis would allow suit to be brought in federal court.
407. See quotation in text accompanying note 145 supra.
408. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). This view has received extensive
criticism. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases,
41 U. CHI. L. REv. 537 (1974). There have been recent decisions that erode the doctrine.
Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823
(7th Cir. 1978).
409. The Court did not decide this question because the state authorities pressed for a
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this problem has not yet been resolved by the post-Younger decisions.
Injunctions against Threatened State Civil Proceedings
In Ex pare Young 410 and in Frink Dairy,41' the state had civil
remedies at its disposal, and the Court gave no indication that it would
treat threatened civil proceedings differently from threatened criminal
proceedings. If state civil remedies discourage assertion of constitu-
tional rights, federal relief is appropriate, as confirmed in a recent Fifth
Circuit case, Morial v. Judiciary Commission.412 In Morial, the plain-
tiff, a judge of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, contemplated candidacy
in the mayoral election for New Orleans. Louisiana law would have
required him to resign his office in order to qualify as a candidate. The
state code of judicial ethics also required resignation, and violation of
the rules in question might have led to judicial disciplinary proceed-
ings. The Fifth Circuit found no Younger objection to a federal suit
challenging this requirement when no state proceedings were pending.
Younger principles, even were we to assume them applicable to disci-
plinary proceedings against a judge . . . have no application when
state proceedings have not been initiated prior to substantial pro-
ceedings on the merits in federal court. . . . Younger principles are
not invoked by the mere fact that federal relief has an impact on state
governmental machinery; even in its quasi-criminal extensions,
Younger dismissal is called for only in those circumstances where
successful defense of a state enforcement proceeding, initiated before
substantial federal proceedings on the merits had occurred, would
fully vindicate the federal plaintiffs federal right.41 3
The court then rejected the plaintiff's federal claim on the merits. The
plaintiff resigned his office. The state court subsequently followed the
Ex parte Young tradition 414 by refusing to disqualify the judge as a
candidate on the basis of his campaigning while still in office.415 His
good faith and speedy prosecution of the federal suit gave him immu-
nity from a charge that he violated the election laws and disqualified
himself from candidacy.
disposition on the merits. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471
(1977).
410. See notes 225-47 & accompanying text supra.
411. See notes 248-52 & accompanying text supra.
412. 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977).
413. 1d at 299; accord, Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980).
414. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
415. Kiefer v. Morial, 351 So. 2d 1216 (La. App. 1977), mandamus denied, 352 So. 2d
1023 (La. 1977), 353 So. 2d 285 (La. 1977).
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Duplicative Civil Rights Actions for Damages
If a federal plaintiff does not demand injunctive relief, Younger
should be no direct obstacle to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the Court's recent recognition416 that duplicative litigation
should be discouraged may be extended to civil rights cases.
In Caldwell v. Camp,4 17 the plaintiff had been arrested for posses-
sion of narcotics. The state instituted proceedings for forfeiture of the
plaintiff's automobile, where the narcotics had been found. Asserting
that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional, the plaintiff sued in fed-
eral court for injunctive relief and damages. The Eighth Circuit dis-
missed the injunction claim because the forfeiture proceedings were in
aid of criminal law enforcement. The court also dismissed the legal
action without prejudice, reasoning that a successful damage action
would disrupt the forfeiture proceedings as much as would an injunc-
tion. The court came to the right result, but should have based its deci-
sion on the desire to minimize duplicative litigation. The. suit for
damages, pressed at a later time, may also interfere with the state's en-
forcement of the criminal law even when the federal damage action is
stayed.
The Second Circuit reached a similar result in Martin v. Merola.41 8
The plaintiffs had been charged in state court, and the state prosecutors
made inflammatory charges to the press that the plaintiffs were linked
to organized crime. The plaintiffs sought damages for the prosecutors'
denial of a fair trial. The Second Circuit approved a dismissal without
prejudice, reasoning that until the criminal trial had concluded, it
would be difficult to assess the plaintiffs' claims on the facts. Moreover,
the court suggested that "it would offend the principle of comity for a
federal district court to inquire into plaintiffs' ability to secure a fair
trial in a pending state prosecution.
'419
The Fifth Circuit took a contrary view in Keyes v. Lauga.420 The
plaintiff had been arrested for assault on a peace officer and for re-
sisting arrest. She brought suit for false arrest, illegal search, and ex-
cessive use of force and recovered a substantial judgment. The state
charges were still pending at the time the civil rights claims went to
416. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
417. 594 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1979).
418. 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976); accord, Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185,
193 (2d Cir. 1980).
419. Id at 194-95.
420. 635 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1981).
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trial. Although some aspects of her civil rights action could arise in a
trial of the criminal charges, the court found abstention inappropriate.
Younger, it observed, barred only federal injunctive or declaratory re-
lief; the Supreme Court has not yet extended it to damage actions. The
Fifth Circuit did not find any of the Court's other abstention doctrines
a bar to the damage action, although it gave no explanation for this
conclusion.
If the state charges in Keyes had been allowed to languish, the
Court's refusal to abstain is understandable. Abstention to avoid du-
plicative litigation presupposes that the other action is proceeding to
judgment. If, however, the Fifth Circuit refused to stay any and all
damage actions in deference to pending state criminal charges, it may
have improperly authorized duplicative litigation.
The courts that have stayed damage actions have presumed or im-
plied that the plaintiff would be free to relitigate constitutional argu-
ments presented in the parallel state action. 421 The Court's recent
decision in Allen v. McCurry,422 however, may not allow such relitiga-




If the Younger doctrine is to become more predictable and satis-
factory, the Court must give clearer guidance on the broader themes
discussed in the first half of this Article. Federal relief should be de-
nied when it promises to duplicate the work of the state courts without
freeing the citizen from oppression. When, however, state process is
oppressive or promises to be inadequate, duplication may be necessary
to avoid these evils. The Court's language in some of its most impor-
tant pronouncements had been misleading. Significant and inappropri-
ate changes have been made in the treatment of the hybrid cases. The
Court should temper the Hicks-Doran rule to grant federal relief when
it is needed. The citizen should not be obliged to cease all arguably
protected conduct to obtain the necessary pre-enforcement judicial
review.
The Court's lack of guidance has been more apparent in relation
to state civil proceedings. Only rarely do state civil proceedings deny
constitutional rights. Avoidance of duplication should be an important
421. See cases cited in text accompanying note - supra.
422. See notes 362-65 & accompanying text supra.
423. See Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981).
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goal,424 unless the protection of constitutional rights, by its nature, calls
for duplication. The Court must decide whether these cases are so spe-
cial that duplication is permissible. Mitchum v. Foster had suggested
an affirmative answer, but the Court's most recent pronouncement on
duplication in civil rights proceedings, Allen v. McCurry, is inconclu-
sive, although it purports to disfavor duplication.425
The most troublesome aspect of Younger is the amorphous nature
of "comity," a slogan that has no logical stopping place and few, if any,
historical boundaries other than in the choice of law context. A belief
that the states should function in their own separate ways can justify
total self-denial by the federal courts of their assigned jurisdiction.
Comity can justify a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, even when, as in
Rizzo v. Goode, the exercise would not duplicate or interfere with the
work of the state courts. Comity, which can be invoked when it is least
expected, seems only to confuse the difficult and important issues that
arise in the co-ordination of duplicative litigation and the protection of
individual rights.4
26
424. See University of Okla. Gay People's Union v. Board of Regents, 661 F.2d 858
(10th Cir. 1981).
425. Professor Field provides a summary of the reasons why civil proceedings should be
treated differently under Younger. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22
WM. & MARY L. Rv. 683, 715 (1981).
426. After this Article was set in print, the United States Supreme Court decided Fair
4ssessment in RealEstate Assln v. McNary, 50 U.S.L.W. 4017 (Dec. 1, 1981). The petitioners
brought a federal damages action to recover for state officials' allegedly discriminatory ac-
tion in the assessment of taxes, which the petitioners had already paid. As they sought
neither injunctive nor declaratory relief, the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976),
would not seem to bar relief. Congress' historical concern has been to allow the collection of
state taxes to proceed unimpeded, with recourse to the taxpayer only after he or she has
made payment. The Court in Mcary relied on the Younger comity concept to bar the
federal suit, reasoning that any award of damages would rest on a finding of unconstitu-
tional conduct. As a federal court may not enjoin or give declaratory relief against the
collection of state taxes, it should not award damages that would rest on the functional
equivalent of a declaration and would discourage the efforts to levy taxes. Thus, the Court
took the unusual step of barring a federal damage action with respect to taxes that had
already been paid.
This line of reasoning could have an enormously broad sweep. Although the damage
action does not have the direct effect of the injunction or the declaration, it has been pre-
sumed and hoped to have a deterrent effect, that is, to shape conduct. Moreover, the declar-
atory nature, albeit implicit, of a civil judgment for damages is neither new nor startling. By
the Court's reasoning, almost all federal damage actions for the deprivation of civil rights
might offend a principle of comity. For example, a damage suit for a strip search conducted
incident to a routine traffic stop would be barred from the federal courts, inasmuch as it
could have a deterrent effect upon police practices.
But the Court was unwilling to say to what extent comity bars damage actions. It held
open the prospect that a damage action for discriminatory taxation on the basis of race
might be heard in a federal court. Id. at 4019 n.4. One can only speculate as to the basis of
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this reservation. Perhaps the Court believed that MeNary involved difficult factual issues
that would be resolved in part under local law. McNary well illustrates the sweeping pos-
sibilities of comity, from which a court recoils, for no articulated reason, even as it decides a
particular case.
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